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INTRODUCTION

So often we overlook the work and the significance of those
who are not in professionaljobs, of those who are not in the
so-called bigjobs. But let me say to you tonight, that whenever
you are engaged in work that serves humanity and is for the
building of humanity, it has dignity, and it has worth. One day
our society must come to see this. One day our society will
come to respect the sanitation worker if it is to survive, for the
person who picks up our garbage, in the final analysis, is as
significant as the physician, for if he doesn't do his job,
diseases are rampant. All labor has dignity.'
- Martin Luther King, Jr.

National labor policy emerged in response to the pervasive labor
disputes and unrest during the 18th and 19th centuries. After numerous failed
legislative efforts, Senator Robert Wagner prevailed and struck a balance
between employer and employee interests with the passage of the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "the Act"), popularly known as "The Wagner
Act." 3 The heart of this legislation-its central purpose-was to vindicate the
rights of workers who were subjected to conditions that are practically
unthinkable in today's post-industrial American society.4 However, the
decrease in pervasive, patently unconscionable working conditions in today's
workplace does not justify rendering the NLRA a toothless and irrelevant piece
of legislation. Just as our society, our economy, and our culture evolves, the

I

Martin Luther King, Jr.: All Labor Has Dignity, TRUTHOUT (Jan. 19, 2015, 9:38 AM)

(citing MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE RADICAL KING (Cornel West ed., 2015)), http://www.
truth-out.org/progressivepicks/item/28568-martin-luther-king-jr-all-labor-has-dignity.
2

PATRICIA SEXTON, THE WAR ON LABOR AND THE LEFT: UNDERSTANDING

AMERICA'S

UNIQUE CONSERVATISM 55-56 (1991) (finding that the numbers of workers killed or injured were
much higher in the United States than in Western European countries); see also Pre-Wagner Act
Labor Relations, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/ourhistory/pre-wagner-act-labor-relations (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449-50 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2013)).
4
See, e.g., Jonathan Grossman, The Coal Strike of 1902-Turning Point in US. Policy, U.S.
DEP'T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/coalstrike.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2015) (describing how President Theodore Roosevelt "feared 'untold misery . .. with the
certainty of riots which might develop into social war"' and further noting that this marked the
change in U.S. policy from "strikebreaker to peacemaker"); see also Eric Hopkins, Working
Hours and Conditions During the Industrial Revolution: A Re-Appraisal, 35 EcON. HIST. REV.
52, 52 (1982) (describing the deplorable working conditions that peaked along with the industrial
revolution); Pre-Wagner Act Labor Relations, supra note 2; Our History, NAT'L LABOR
RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/pre-wagner-act-labor-relations (last
visited Nov. 11, 2015).
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NLRA, although an aged construct, must evolve to meet the needs of today's
workplace and the social media presence of employees. This evolution requires
the inclusion of electronic communications and social media in the doctrine of
concerted activity.5 So long as the evils the Act was meant to eradicate persist,
the NLRA must remain relevant and true to its original purpose. 6 Although the
industrial, legal, and social landscapes have changed over the years, the battle
for workers' rights continues and is as alive today as it was a century ago.7 For
the average worker to succeed, the NLRA's protection of concerted activity
must evolve along with the workplace to broadly protect employees' social
media activity and electronic communications.
Current administrative material and adjudication does not adequately
protect the actions of individual employees on social media. Over the past
several years, the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB" or "Board")
General Counsel has issued several memoranda in an effort to stay current with
developing forms of communication and how their relationship with the law
and the workplace evolve.9 After the NLRB's articulation of its position on
social media, a rule emerged: in short, an employee's social media activity is

5
See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2013) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers offullfreedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection." (emphasis added)).
6
Id.
7
See generally Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Work Stoppages in 2014
(Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkstp.nrO.htm (noting that work stoppages are
down in recent years). But see Labor Dispute, CHI. TRIB., http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
keyword/labor-dispute (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (listing numerous recent labor disputes taking
place across the country).
8
See infra Part VI.
9

See The NLRB and Social Media, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/

news-outreach/fact-sheets/nlrb-and-social-media (last visited Nov. 6, 2015); see also Press
Release, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., Acting General Counsel Releases Report on Social Media
Cases (Aug. 18, 2011), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/acting-general-counselreleases-report-so cial-media-cases (providing a link to a "report detailing the outcome of
investigations into 14 cases involving the use of social mediea and the employer's social and
general media policies"); Press Release, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., Acting General Counsel
Issues Second Social Media Report (Jan. 25, 2012), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/newsMemorandum from Anne
story/acting-general-counsel-issues-second-social-media-report;
Purcell, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., to All Regional Directors, Officers-inCharge, and Resident Officers, OM 11-74, Report of the Acting General Counsel Concerning
Social Media Cases 9 (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.huschblackwell.com/-/media/files/business
insights/businessinsights/2012/04/labor/o20%20employment%20seminar/files/ogc%20memo%2
Oom%2011-74%20aug%2018%202011/fileattachmentlogc%20memo%20om%2011%2074%20a
ug%2018%20 2 01 1.pdf [hereinafter AGC Memorandum 1].
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protected only if that activity solicits a response from a coworker.'o However,
"the question of whether an employee engaged in concerted activity is, at its
heart, a factual one" that the Board must decide in the first instance.' This rule
requiring a response from a coworker fails to recognize a well-established
aspect of concerted activity: the action of a single employee seeking to induce
group action or bring truly group complaints to the attention of management is
protected under the NLRA.
This Note argues that the National Labor Relations Board and the
courts should awaken and reinvigorate the spirit of the NLRA and its "sleeping
beauties" by applying the concerted-activity doctrine to social-media activity in
the same employee-focused manner that they have applied the doctrine to other
electronic communication. 12 This intersection of law and technology provides
the perfect opportunity for the interpretation of the NLRA to comport with its
original purpose: to vindicate and protect the collective, concerted rights of all
technological
and nonunion alike.1 3 Specifically,
workers-union
advancements and the explosion of social media have provided the Board and
the courts a unique opportunity to revisit the doctrine of protected concerted
activity in the burgeoning context of social media. As discussed in further
detail below,1 4 the doctrine of protected concerted activity extends statutory
protection to all employees who act together-and even alone in some
circumstances-to improve the terms and conditions of employment.
This Note sets the stage by first providing in Part II a broad overview
of the labor movement, the NLRA, and the NLRB's role in interpreting the Act.
Part III discusses employees' key rights under the Act and hones in on the
doctrine of protected concerted activity; more specifically, it asks how that
doctrine applies to and affects the nonunion workforce in the context of
electronic communications and social media. Next, Part IV demonstrates the
role of social media in workers' organizational efforts and the limited instances
in which the Board has applied the concerted action doctrine.

10

Rozlyn Fulgoni-Britton, NLRB Issues Guidanceon Social Media Policies andActivity, 21

No. 10 IND. EMP. L. LETTER 5.

11
See Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (Meyers 1), remanded sub nom.,
Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd, Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882
(1986) (Meyers Il), enforced sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
12

See infra Parts V-VI; see also, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration
of
the NationalLabor RelationsAct Without Statutory Change, 5 FLA. INT'L U. L. REv. 361, 361-63

(2010) (recognizing that the unionization rate in private companies is down from 35% in the
1950s to under 8% in 2010, and arguing for "changes the NLRB can implement on its own,
without statutory amendment, to improve its administration of the NLRA in its core functions of
resolving questions concerning representation and enforcing the Act's prohibitions against
employer and union misconduct").
'3
See 29 U.S.C. § 15 1(d) (2013).
14

See infra Parts III.B-C.
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Part V of this Note recognizes the oscillation in the Board's precedent
in relation to the changes in the demographics of the workplace and worker
organization. This wavering and often regressive precedent is a result of antiunion campaigns in both the private and public sectors and the disparate
distribution of power between employer and employee." Part VI examines the
Board's willingness to adopt worker-focused jurisprudence and argues, among
other things, that because of demographic changes in worker organization, the
future of the NLRA's relevance lies largely in a broad construction of the
doctrine of protected concerted activity when applied in the context of social
media and electronic communications.
Finally, this Note concludes that the Board and the courts have shown a
proclivity for a worker-focused interpretation of protected concerted activity
when applied to the changing way people communicate. Through a broad
interpretation of the concerted-activity doctrine as it relates to social media, the
Board can awaken the dormant spirit of the NLRA, crafting worker-focused
precedent that recognizes the realities of both the labor movement and the
workplace, bolstering workers' right to organize, and providing a
counterweight to the erosion of unionization and unions' rights.
II. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

The NLRA is the progeny of the first federal statute that codified the
rights of workers, which has been applied to define the ever-changing
employment relationship, responsive to changes in labor, industry, and the
economy. Framed by the history of the labor movement, Part II.A provides an
overview of the NLRA. Part II.B then discusses how the expansive piece of
legislation is implemented, interpreted, and enforced by the NLRB.
A.

History and Purpose of the NLRA

Workers' demands for increased and improved rights triggered the
labor movement that culminated in statutory protections for all employees." In
the summer of 1935, Congress wove the NLRA-now known as the Wagner
Act-into the statutory fabric of national labor policy, codifying workers'

1s

See infra Part V.B (discussing the oscillation in the Board's interpretation of protected

concerted activity); see also JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIc WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE

UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900-1962, at 199-200 (2004).
16
See generally infra Parts IV-V (examining the role of social media in employees' efforts
to organize and concerted action on social media).
"7
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
18
See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (defining employer and employee under the Act).
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rights and providing for enforcement of those rights." It is a legislative
hallmark of the New Deal era that sought to promote industrial stability and
peace 2 0 and to redress the "inequality of bargaining power" between employer
and employee. 2 1 At the macro level, these goals were-and are-to be achieved
through progressive labor policies that "diminish the causes of labor disputes
burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce, [by] creat[ing] a
National Labor Relations Board, and for other purposes."2 2 Such policies' goals
were achieved in the workplace by empowering workers and imposing
limitations on employers' more coercive, and relatively unfettered, control of
the employment relationship because, among other reasons, the free market
simply failed to do so.23
19
The 1935 Passageof the Wagner Act, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov
/who-we-are/our-history/1 935-passage-wagner-act (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
20
29 U.S.C. § 151 ("The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize
and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes
and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce. . . .").
21
Id ("The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the

corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of
commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and

the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of
competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.").
22
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449,449 (1935).
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees
to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury,
impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by
removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by

encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial
disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers
and employees.
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some
labor organizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the

necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free
flow of goods in such commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial
unrest or through concerted activities which impair the interest of the public
in the free flow of such commerce. The elimination of such practices is a
necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for

the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or
other mutual aid or protection.

29 U.S.C.§ 151.
23

See Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for

Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 59, 71-80 (1993) (recognizing several market
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Organizations-both anti- and pro-labor-existed, in some shape or
form, in the United States as early as the late-18th 2 4 and early- 19th centuries. 25
After the Civil War, significant technological advancements led to birth of the
American Industrial Revolution, which resulted in increased labor tensions and
a growing disparity of wealth and power between employers and employees.
These conditions set the stage for the bloodiest, "most violent labor history in
the Western world."27
Despite a hostile legal environment, dramatic and often violent labor
disputes ensued over dangerous and arduous conditions of employment. 2 8 AS
such disputes became more prevalent, more violent, and increasingly within the
purview of the general public, 29 unions gained traction, union membership
grew, and national labor organizations were formed. 30 The first was the
National Labor Union, which was formed in 1866 but lasted only six years.

failures in the contractual relationship between the employer and employee); Cass R. Sunstein,
Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity: A Comment, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 1041, 1059 (1984)
(arguing that reliance on market forces to reflect employees' values is misplaced because that
reliance fails to consider that unconstrained market forces in labor may produce allocations of
power that are undesirable for society); see also MAURICE DOBB, STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CAPITALISM 223 (1947) ("The capitalist system presupposes the complete separation of the
labourers from all property in the means by which they can realize their labour .... The
expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil is the basis of the whole
process.").
SETH D. HARRIS ET AL., MODERN LABOR LAW IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS:
CASES
AND MATERIALS 5-6 (2013); see also ROBERT R.R. BROOKS, UNIONS OF THEIR OwN CHOOSING:
24

AN ACCOUNT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND ITS WORK 37 (1939) (noting that

anti-labor organizations date back to 1798, but the first national anti-union employers'
organization was founded after the Civil War, followed by large growth in the 1880s and 1890s).
25
See, e.g., HARRIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 5 ("The first reported labor case in the U.S. was
Commonwealth v. Pullis, 3 Commons & Gilmore 59 (Mayor's Ct. 1806) often called the
'Philadelphia Cordewainers' Case.").
26
BROOKS, supra note 24, at 37 ("This inequality resulted in the piling up of superabundant
means of production in the face of inadequate mass consuming power. . . . Wages had a constant
tendency to lag behind increasing productivity because workers did not have the organized power
to drive them up.").
27

SLATER, supra note 15, at 199; see also MELVYN DUBOFSKY &
FOSTER RHEA DULLES,

LABOR IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 151 (8th ed. 2010) (opining that the Homestead steel strike of
1892, in Pittsburgh, was "a battle which for bloodthirstiness and boldness was not excelled in
actual warfare"); HARRIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 6; SEXTON, supra note 2, at 55-56 (finding that
the numbers of workers killed or injured were much higher in the United States than in Western
European countries).
2

JAMES S. OLSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 6-7 (Robert

L. ShaIle ed., 2002); see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 24, at 6.
2
3o

See MELYVN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA xvii (1994).
See, e.g., 2 JOHN R. COMMONS ET AL., HISTORY OF LABOUR IN THE UNITED
STATES 4-6

(1918).
31

See, e.g., id. at 85.
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However, the momentum continued: the American Federation of Labor was
formed later in 1886, and by 1924 it had over 2 million members.32
The increasingly violent and divisive labor disputes between employers
and employees, coupled with the growing strength of unions, spurred the
legislature to react to the readily apparent need to recognize and codify
employees' rights.3 3 Thus, after several legislative efforts, the National Labor
Relations Act was born in 1935.34 The purpose of the Act was two-fold: (1) to
promote industrial stability and peace3 ' and (2) to redress the "inequality of
bargaining power."36
To achieve this broad two-fold purpose, the NLRA grants employees
four essential non-exclusive rights that provide them the leverage to
meaningfully influence the terms and conditions of their employment: (1) the
right to form, join, or assist unions, (2) the right to self-organize, (3) the right to
bargain collectively, and (4) the right to engage in concerted activities. 37 In the
changing construct and demographics of the workplace, it is the right of all
employees to engage in protected concerted activity that is central in their
pursuit to change the terms and conditions of employment. As discussed below,
Section 7 is the heart of the NLRA, granting sweeping rights to employeesunion and nonunion alike. Section 7 is especially important for the nonunion
worker because portions of Section 7 apply to all employees, thus granting
important rights to the nonunionized workforce.39 Ultimately, the NLRA
codified what some contend are inherently collective and communal rights,4 0
creating a powerful tool for employees to push back against their historically
more coercive and powerful employers.4 1
32

OLSON, supra note 28, at 6-7.

33
See, e.g., National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 701-712 (1934) (repealed 1935)).
34
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449-50 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2013)).
3
29 U.S.C. § 151.
36
Id.
3
29 U.S.C. § 157.

See infra Part 1I.B; see also 29 U.S.C. § 157.
3
See infra Part III; see also 29 U.S.C. § 157.
40
Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1417, 1423 (1984) ("suggest[ing] that
the right of workers to engage in concerted activities . . . is an example of a communal right").
41
See Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers' Rights: The
Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REv. 1, 41-42 (2007) [hereinafter Lofaso, The
Autonomous Dignified Worker] (describing the coercive power of the employer over the
employee); Lynd, supra note 40, at 1422-23 ("'[C]ommunal rights' are not the opposite of
'individual rights.' Communal rights, whether exercised by groups or individuals, are rights
characteristic of a society in which the free development of each has become the condition of the
free development of all. The opposite of a communal right is any right which presupposes that
what is accessible to one person is therefore unavailable to another.").
38
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B. Implementation, Interpretation,and Enforcement of the NLRA: The
National Labor Relations Board
Like many expansive statutory acts, the NLRA provided for the
creation of an administrative body, the National Labor Relations Board.42 The
NLRB is "an independent federal agency vested with the power to safeguard
employees' rights to organize and to determine whether to have unions as their
bargaining representative." 4 3 The Board is further charged with remedying and
preventing unfair labor practices committed by employers.4 4
Although employers' rights and interests have crept into the
interpretation and administration of the NLRA, the original language of the Act
focused mainly on the imbalance of power and the underrepresented rights of
employees.4 5 Section 7 of the Act provides that
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective

42

29 U.S.C. § 153.

43
The NLRB Process, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrbprocess (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
44
29 U.S.C. § 158(a); What We Do, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov
/what-we-do (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
45
See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449-50 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2013)) ("The denial by employers of the right of
employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or
the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency,
safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the current of
commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or
manufactured or processed goods in commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and
wages in such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or
into the channels of commerce. The inequality of bargainingpower between employees who do
not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasingpower of wage earners in industry and by preventing
the stabilizationof competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively safeguards commerce from injury . . . ." (emphasis added)). But see National Labor
Relations Act, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-laborrelations-act (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) ("Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in
1935 to protect the rights of employees and employers, to encourage collective-bargaining, and
to curtail certain private sector labor and management practices, which can harm the general
welfare of workers, business and the U.S. economy.").
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bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment ... .46
"Section 7 rights"'" 7 are the core of employees' rights under the
NLRA. Specifically, Section 7 delineates the statutory rights of private-sector
employees, including some of the specific types of activities that employees
may engage in under the Act's protection. 4 9 These rights apply to all private
sector employees,so including nonunion employees." This Note focuses on the
portion of Section 7 that empowers all private sector employees by protecting
their right to engage in concerted action: "Employees shall have the right
48

to .

.

. engage in . .. concerted activities for the purpose of.

..

mutual aid or

protection."5 2

46

29 U.S.C. § 157.

47
See, e.g., Tradesman Int'l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460 (2002). "Section 7" refers to the public law
section number of the NLRA, now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 ("Section 7 rights" is the
colloquial language used by the courts and the National Labor Relations Board when referring to
employees' rights under 29 U.S.C. § 157).
48
Lee Modjeska, The Reagan NLRB, Phase 1, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 108 (1985).
49
See 29 U.S.C. § 157.
50
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) ("The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not
be
limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has
not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any
individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person
at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the
status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.], as
amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.").
s1
Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 157; Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978) (finding
that all employees'-including nonunion employees-activity is protected under the doctrine of
"mutual aid or protection" when "seek[ing] to improve terms and conditions of employment or
otherwise improve their lot as employees through channels outside the immediate employeremployee relationship"); Fulgoni-Britton, supra note 10 ("Some employers make the mistake of
assuming that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the NLRB's actions don't affect
them because they aren't unionized. However, the NLRA gives both union and nonunion
employees the right to engage in protected concerted activities. Generally, two or more
employees acting together to address a concern about terms or conditions of employment
constitutes protected concerted activity. Additionally, a single employee who (1) acts on behalf
of others[;] (2) initiates, induces, or prepares for group action[;] or (3) discusses the matter with
coworkers can also be engaged in protected concerted activity.").
52
29 U.S.C. § 157.
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Section 8(a) of the NLRA establishes boundaries and guidelines at the
intersection of the employers' business interests and the employees' interests in
asserting their Section 7 rights.53 Section 8(a) prohibits a range of employer
conduct by making it "an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
[Section 7]."54 Therefore, if an employee's activity is considered to be
protected concerted activity under Section 7, the employer commits an unfair
labor practice if it knowingly interferes with, restrains, or coerces the employee
in the engagement of those activities."
If a charge alleging an unfair labor practice is filed with the appropriate
regional office, the Regional Director conducts an investigation and determines
whether formal action should be taken against an employer. 56 After the
Regional Director files a complaint and notice of hearing, an NLRB
Administrative Law Judge ("AL") presides over an adjudication and issues a
decision on behalf of the Board. If the ALJ finds that the employer committed
an unfair labor practice, the Board will order a remedy, which generally
includes a cease and desist order regarding the practice that was in violation of
the NLRA." The employer may appeal, and the appellate courts have the
authority to "enforce, set aside or remand all or part of the case."5 9 The United
States Supreme Court serves as the court of last resort.60
As discussed below, the fluctuations in the makeup of the Boardoften along political party lines-creates a somewhat unstable and
unpredictable legal atmosphere.61 At the same time, the Board has the
autonomy to interpret the NLRA in various-sometimes inconsistent-ways so
long as its interpretation is reasonable.6 2 Because the doctrine of concerted
activity is widely applicable and expansive, it is central to many cases that
come before the Board.63 Thus, few labor law doctrines have suffered from the
fluctuation in Board composition and inconsistent treatment like the doctrine of

5

29 U.S.C. § 158(a).

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Unfair Labor Practice Process Chart, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.

gov/resources/nlrb-process/unfair-labor-practice-process-chart
5

Id.

58

Id.

5

Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).

(last visited Nov. 6, 2015).

60

UnfairLaborPracticeProcessChart, supra note 56.

61

See infra Part V.B.
See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

62
63

See generally Protected Concerted Activity, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.

nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/protected-concerted-activity (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (providing a
map of recent concerted activity cases around the country).
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protected concerted activity.64 Before examining how the doctrine of concerted
activity can be interpreted to comport with the purpose of the Act and expand
employees' rights, a discussion of the rule of protected concerted activity, its
current interpretation, and its application to various circumstances provides
useful guidance.
III. EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS UNDER THE NLRA AND THE RULE OF PROTECTED
CONCERTED ACTIVITY

Although the NLRA is often associated with the rights, regulations, and
operations of unions, there are provisions within the Act that extend to protect
the rights of all employees, including nonunion employees.6 s These provisions
are the sleeping beauties of the NLRA. 6 6 As such, many employees--especially
nonunion employees-do not know these provisions exist and, thus, do not
know the extent of their legal rights.67 In fact, most employees harbor grave
misconceptions as to their legal rights within the workplace.68 These
misconceptions are due to a number of reasons, such as employer and

64
See infra Part V; see also Guard Publ'g. Co. (Register-Guard), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007),
enforced in relevant part and remanded, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir 2009), overruled by Purple
Commc'ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 2014 WL 6989135 (2014); Alleluia Cushion Co., 221
N.L.R.B. 999 (1975), overruled by Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Samuel
Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV.
163, 163-65 (1985) (describing the oscillation of Board decisions and precedent).
65
29 U.S.C. §§152(3), 157 (2013); see also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978)
(finding that all employees' (including nonunion employees) activity is protected under the
doctrine of "mutual aid or protection" when "seek[ing] to improve terms and conditions of
employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees through channels outside the immediate
employer-employee relationship"); Rozlyn Fulgoni-Britton, supra note 10.
66
See 29 U.S.C. § 157.
67
See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 136 (1997).
Unions have representatives who educate employees about their rights and bargain on their
behalf; nonunion employees are left to their own perceptions in a complex legal framework that
is anything but intuitive. Moreover, at-will-employee perceptions-or misconceptions-have
been recognized to be the basis of psychological contracts between employer and employee. Jill
Kickul & Scott W. Lester, Broken Promises: Equity Sensitivity as a Moderator Between
Psychological Contract Breach and Employee Attitudes and Behavior, 16 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL.
191, 192 (2001). These non-legal contracts create a belief that an employer is bound to act as he
has in the past or in accordance with a promise. See Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Sandra L.
Robinson, When Employees Feel Betrayed: A Model of How PsychologicalContract Violation
Develops, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 226, 228 (1997).
68
See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 119 (1999) (finding
that 83% of employees thought that they could only be fired for cause); see also Kim, supra note
67 at 134 (survey data showing a misunderstanding by employee-respondents of several legal
rules governing the employment relationship).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol118/iss2/9

12

Hogan: Awakening the Spirit of the NLRA: The Future of Concerted Activit

2015]

THE FUTURE OF THE NLRA AND SOCIAL MEDIA

853

employee ignorance of the law, employers' blatant disregard of the law, or
intentional misrepresentation of the law. 9
For example, many employees are led to believe that they cannot
discuss their wages with coworkers. Such employment policies-whether
implicit or explicit-are known as "wage gag rules." 70 However, these policies
fly in the face of well-established legal precedent and the fundamental rights
established by Section 7.71 Employers cannot prohibit or chill employees'
exercise of their statutory rights, and it is undisputed that wages are one of the
most fundamental terms and conditions of employment.72 Accordingly,
employers violate the Act when they prohibit employees from discussing
wages 3 and also when they discipline employees for breaking that unlawful
work policy. 7 4 Employees' rights, especially in the nonunionized workplace,
suffer a similar misunderstanding and dormancy. Employees have federal
statutory rights under the NLRA that extend beyond the limited protections
offered by other federal and state employment protections in at-will
As fully discussed below, all private sector
employment relationships.
employees have the right to take concerted action for mutual aid or protection.
Part III.A begins by discussing the interpretation of employees' statutory
right to communicate about the terms and conditions of their employment. Part

69

See generally Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, "Love, Sex and Politics?Sure. Salary? No

Way": Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168-69

(2004).
70
Id. at 171 (noting that the practice of employer pay secrecy rules is common and often
illegal); see also Sacha Cohen, Shhh, They're Talking Salary, USA TODAY (Dec. 20, 2002, 5:07
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/jobcenter/jobhunt/salary/2002-12-20-salary-talk-x.
htm.
71
Bierman & Gely, supra note 69, at 169 ("[T]he right of employees to talk to each other
about pay is as fundamental as any activity intended to receive NLRA protection."); see also,
e.g., NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Care Ctr., 218 F.3d 531, 534 (6th Cir. 2000); Fredericksburg
Glass & Mirror, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 165, 173-74, 179 (1997).
72
See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 796 n.1 (1945); Lafayette Park
Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998), enforced, 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that an
employer commits an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a rule
that "would reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights").
7
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2013).
74
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
7
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2013)) (prohibiting
discrimination in the workplace on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin);
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2013)) (prohibiting discrimination in the
workplace on the basis of age); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No.
101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2013))
(prohibiting discrimination in the workplace on the basis of disability).
76
29 U.S.C. § 157.
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III.B hones in on the rule of protected concerted activity. Part III.C lays out the
limitations of this doctrine. Finally, Part III.D examines how the Board and the
courts have applied the doctrine of concerted activity to various forms of
communication, which provides some framework for its application to social
media and electronic communications.
A.

Employees'Right to Communicate

In any political or social movement, communication among members is
essential to its success. The same is true in the workplace; communication
among and between employees is critical to the success of any organizing
campaign or concerted goal. Thus, employees' right to communicate with each
other about unionization, terms and conditions of employment, and topics of
mutual interest have long been pitted against employers' interests to control
their property and limit employee communications. Communication in the
workplace is an aspect of the employment relationship that has been at the
center of countless cases, and the only consensus is that neither the employer's
right to limit communication nor the employee's right to communicate is
absolute.n The Court has found that "the validity of employer rules restricting
union solicitation or distribution of union literature on plant premises depends
upon 'an adjustment between the undisputed right of self-organization assured
to employees under the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of
employers to maintain discipline in their establishments."'" 8
In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB," the Supreme Court developed
the basic and longstanding framework to achieve a balance between the
employees' Section 7 rights and employers' property interests.80 The Court
addressed several consolidated cases arising out of similar circumstances:
employers banning union solicitation on their property. Republic Aviation
expressly recognized that employees have a right to communicate about
unionization and exercise their Section 7 rights. 82 Considering these interests,
the Court developed a shifting presumption test that balances the employer's
and employee's interests: "It is therefore within the province of an employer to

n

See infra text accompanying notes 86-92.
Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 616-17 (1962) (quoting Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945)).
7
324 U.S. 793.
8o
See id.; see also Beth Isr. Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978); NLRB v. Magnavox
Co. of Tenn., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974) ("The place of work is a place uniquely appropriate for
dissemination of views concerning the bargaining representative and the various options open to
the employees. ... [B]anning of [employee solicitations at work] might seriously dilute [Section]
7 rights.").
8
See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. 793.
82
Id. at 803.
78
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promulgate and enforce a [non-discriminatory] rule prohibiting union
solicitation during working hours," and such rules will be presumptively
valid.83 However, that presumptive right is tempered by the recognition that
"time outside working hours, whether before or after work, or during luncheon
or rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes without unreasonable
restraint, although the employee is on company property."84 Therefore, any rule
that unreasonably impedes employee self-organization during non-working
time is presumed to be unlawful absent evidence that the rule is "necessary in
order to maintain production or discipline. 8 5
The Board has furthered its well-established shifting presumption
framework by extending it to presumptively prohibit an employer's restriction
of employees' solicitations regarding Section 7 rights during non-work time
and in non-work areas.86 However, that same presumption does not necessarily
extend to written material. Rather, as long as employees have reasonable
alternative means of distribution, employers can presumptively prohibit
distribution of written solicitations at work, such as pamphlets, leaflets, and
cards, even during non-work time. 8 In short, employees' Section 7
communications are presumptively protected during non-work time but are
presumptively unprotected during work time. In contrast, non-employee
solicitations or attempts at communication with employees do not enjoy the
same level of protection as employee speech.89
As discussed above, Republic Aviation recognized employees' right to
communicate regarding Section 7 issues on their employer's property during
non-work times. However, in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 90 the Court limited its
holding in Republic Aviation by recognizing an employer's right to forbid nonemployee union organizers from soliciting on the employer's private property
when other reasonable alternatives exist. 91 The synthesis of these two doctrines
is that (1) an employer's property rights generally trump non-employees' right
to communication in the workplace as long as there are not "unique obstacles"

8
84

85

Id. at 803 n.10 (quoting Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943)).
Id.

Id

See, e.g., LeTourneau Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1260 (1944), aff'd sub nom. Republic
Aviation, 324 U.S. 793; see also TeleTech Holdings, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 402, 403 (2001); Peyton
Packing, 49 N.L.R.B. at 843-44.
87
Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 617-21 (1962).
88
Id.
89
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532-35 (1992).
90
502 U.S. 527.
91
Id. at 532, 538 (finding, in a case where the union solicitors were nonemployees and they
had reasonable access to employees without entering the property of the employer, that Section 7
does not confer rights upon unions or nonemployee organizers, and a property rights balancing
analysis is unnecessary unless there is no reasonable access to employees).
86
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to accessing employees,92 and (2) employee communications regarding Section
7 rights are generally afforded greater protection and deference,
notwithstanding this doctrine's effect on non-employee communications. 93
Under this framework, the distinction between employee communications and
non-employee communications is significant. 9 4 Thus, the Board and courts
alike strive to strike a balance between employees' statutory rights under the
NLRA and the employer's property interests, but when it comes to limiting
employee communications, the stakes are high. 95
B. Protected ConcertedActivity
Employee activity for the "mutual aid and protection" of coworkers
must meet three elements to be protected under the NLRA: (1) it must be
concerted activity, (2) it must be for a legitimate purpose, and (3) it must be
achieved by legitimate means.96 Under Section 7, the activity must be
"concerted" before it can be "protected," but not all concerted activity is
protected under the purview of the NLRA." Employees acting concertedly for
mutual aid or protection generally seek to further a group's-or individual
employee's-interests that stem from a specific grievance pertaining to the
terms or conditions of their joint employment.98 The terms and conditions of
employment that employees may seek to improve under the Act include, but
are not limited to, "wages, benefits, working hours, the physical environment,
dress codes, assignments, responsibilities, and the like." 99 As one may assume
from the plain language, concerted activity includes instances where multiple

92

Id. at 535, 538, 540-41.

Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 796 (1945).
94
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956).
See id.; Metro. Dist. Council & Vicinity United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 68
95
F.3d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1995); Leslie Homes, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 123, 125, 129 (1995); see also
UFCW v. NLRB (Oakland Mall H1 and Loehmann 's Plaza II), 74 F.3d 292, 298-99 (D.C. Cir.
1996).
96
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2013); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); NLRB v.
Local 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard Broad. Co.), 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
29 U.S.C. § 157; New River Indus. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290, 1295 (4th Cir. 1991)
9
("[W]hen employees collaborate to criticize matters that are not related to the mutual aid and
protection of employees, this activity is not protected 'concerted activity.').
98
See generally NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (finding that nonunion,
unorganized factory workers' conduct was protected concerted activity when they walked out to
protest extremely cold working conditions because they were acting for mutual aid and
protection).
9
New River, 945 F.2d at 1294. (recognizing the importance of a worker-focused
9

interpretation of the Act).
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employees are acting together to achieve a common employment-related
goal. 0 0 However, as discussed below, it extends to the less obvious as well.
Although the framework of protected concerted activity is conceptually
simple, misconceptions of industrial life and the relationships between
employees and employers have proven to be a stumbling block for the courts.
Such misconceptions result in an application of the doctrine that fails to reflect
the reality of the workplace. Although Judge Learned Hand has been accused
of being out of touch with reality in some instances, o he hit the mark on the
realities of the workplace while so many other jurists had difficulty grasping
the manifest reality of concerted activity in its actual context:102
When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause
with a fellow workman over his separate grievance, and go out
on strike in his support, they engage in a 'concerted activity'
for 'mutual aid or protection,' although the aggrieved workman
is the only one of them who has any immediate stake in the
outcome. The rest know that by their action each one of them
assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support of
the one whom they are all then helping; and the solidarity so
established is 'mutual aid' in the most literal sense, as nobody
doubts. So too . . [when] the immediate quarrel does not itself
concern them, but by extending the number of those who will
make the enemy of one the enemy of all, the power of each is
vastly increased. 0 3

100

Id

1o

See Nina Totenberg, Notes on a Life, in THE LEGACY OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG 3-5
(Scott Dodson ed., 2015) (describing how Judge Learned Hand did not hire Justice Ginsburg as a
law clerk because he could not swear in front of a woman, yet, "[a]s it turned out though,
Ginsburg's boss, Judge Palmieri, would often give Hand a ride home from work, and Hand
would sit in the front seat singing sea shanties and swearing up a storm. Ginsburg, sitting in the
backseat, was transfixed. She finally asked why, if Hand said 'whatever came into his head' in
the car, he had refused to consider her as a law clerk on grounds that he wouldn't feel free to
speak without censoring himself? Replied Hand: 'Young lady, I am not looking at you.').
102

See STEPHAN THERNSTROM, POVERTY AND PROGRESS: SOCIAL MOBILITY IN
A NINETEENTH

CENTURY CITY 1 (9th ed. 1994) (quoting Frederick Law Olmstead (1859)) ("Men of literary
taste ... are always apt to overlook the working-classes, and to confine the records they make of
their own times, in great degree, to the habits and fortunes of their own associates, and to those of
people of superior rank to themselves, of whose sayings and doings their vanity, as well as their
curiosity, leads them most carefully to inform themselves. The dumb masses have often been so
lost in this shadow of egotism, that, in later days, it has been impossible to discern the very real
influence their character and condition has had on the fortune and fate of the nation.").
103
NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir.
1942).
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Nevertheless, as articulated in Interboro Contractors Inc.'0 the
participation of two or more employees towards a common goal is not
dispositive in determining whether employees' actions were protected
concerted activity, as the term may suggest. The doctrine extends to the less
obvious. Enforcing the Board's Interboro doctrine, the United States Supreme
Court has held that individual employees engage in protected concerted activity
when they are honestly and reasonably asserting bargained-for privileges under
a collective-bargaining agreement to contradict the directions or orders of their
employer.105 In the nonunion workplace, the question becomes when, if ever, a
nonunion employee's individual actions are protected concerted activity. The
Board addressed this question in Meyers Industries, Inc. v. NLRB and its
progeny. 106 These cases established three important standards for determining
whether individual employees' activity in a nonunion workforce is concerted:
(1) when "[the activity] be engaged in with or on the authority of other
employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself";'0 7 (2) in
"circumstances where individual employees seek to initiate or induce or to
prepare for group action"; 10 and (3) when "individual employees bring[] truly
group complaints to the attention of management." 09
Further, the Supreme Court found no statutory or public policy support
for the "view that employees lose their protection under the 'mutual aid or
protection' clause when they seek to improve terms and conditions of
employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees through channels
outside the immediate employee-employer relationship.""H 0 In dicta, the Court
recognized, however, that "some concerted activity bears a less immediate

'
157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966) (recognizing an individual employee's honest and
reasonable invocation of a collectively bargained right to be concerted activity), enforced, 388
F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
1os
NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 840 (1984). But see NLRB v. City
Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 842 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Although the concepts
of individual action for personal gain and 'concerted activity' are intuitively incompatible, the
Court today defers to the Board's judgment that the Interboro doctrine is necessary to safeguard
the exercise of rights previously won in the collective bargaining process. Since I consider the
Interboro doctrine to be an exercise in undelegated legislative power by the Board, I respectfully
dissent.").
106
See generally Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755
F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), enforced sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
107
Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497.
1os
Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887.
109

Id.

Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 & n.14 (1978) (noting that the "NorrisLaGuardia Act expresses Congress' recognition of the 'right of wage earners to organize and to
act jointly in questions affecting wages, conditions of labor, and the welfare oflabor generally'
(quoting S. REP. No. 72-163, at 9 (1932))).
110
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relationship to employees' interests as employees than other such activity. We
may assume that at some point the [employee-employer] relationship becomes
so attenuated that an activity cannot fairly be deemed to come within the
'mutual aid or protection clause.""
In a progressive interpretation of protected concerted activity, both the
Third and Fourth Circuits have recognized the Board doctrine that
conversations alone may constitute concerted activity if the conversation "had
some relation to group action in the interest of employees."1 2 Although this
position was not exempt from criticism by sister circuits,' 13 it has been
overwhelmingly accepted despite efforts to limit its reaches."14
The current standard used to determine whether an individual,
nonunion employee's action is protected concerted activity, as articulated in
Meyers I and Meyers II, asks whether the employee's activity was "engaged in
with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of
the employee himself.""'5 The Board clarified in Meyers II that the "definition
of concerted activity ... encompasses those circumstances where individual
employees seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well as
individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the attention of
management.""'6 Further, it may be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
preemptively terminate an employee because of a concern that he will engage
in concerted activity in the future." 7
In sum, the activity must be concerted, it must not be too far removed
from the employment relationship, and it must be engaged in by one or more
employees on behalf of their coworkers to be protected. Concerted action is
I'

Id. at 567-68.
Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964); see also OwensComing Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969) ("[A]ctivity of a single
employee in enlisting the support of his fellow employees for their mutual aid and protection is
as much 'concerted activity' as is ordinary group activity.").
113
Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 28 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing Indiana Gear Works
v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1967)); see also Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. NLRB, 390 F.2d
338, 342-43 (9th Cir. 1968) ("[P]ublic venting of a personal grievance, even a grievance shared
by others, is not a concerted activity.").
114
See El Gran Combo de P.R. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 996, 1004 (1st Cir. 1988) (following
Mushroom Transp., 330 F.2d 683); Roadway Express v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687, 693 (11th Cir.
1983) (same), vacatedfor other reasons, 446 U.S. 920 (1984); Pioneer Nat. Gas Co. v. NLRB,
662 F.2d 408, 418 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); see also Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999
(1975), overruled by Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (expanding the doctrine
of concerted action by presuming that employees would have authorized another employee to
speak on their behalf).
1s
Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984), remandedsub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941
(D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), enforced sub nom. Prill v. NLRB,
835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
116
Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887.
117
Parexel Int'l, LLC, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 82, *4 (Jan. 28, 2011).
112
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driven by communal interest in the terms and conditions of employment; it
spurs improvement of the employment relationship through the power of
employee solidarity. The power and influence of group solidarity creates the
individual interest for the non-aggrieved employee to join his coworker in his
struggle." 8 After all, solidarity is the heart of any labor movement; an "injury
to one is an injury to all.""' Yet, there are limits to the protection of concerted
activity. 2 0
C.

The Bounds ofProtection

Consistent with the adage, "[y]our right to swing your arms ends just
where the other man's nose begins," emgloyees' right to engage in protected
concerted activity is not without limits.' ' An employee's right to engage in
protected concerted activity ends-or extends to-where federal law, state law,
or the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement begin.1 2 2 Employees' activity
will lose protection of the Act if it is considered to be "opprobrious conduct," 23
or if it is openly disloyal and disparaging of the business itself.1 24 As a general
matter, unprovoked profane, defamatory, threatening, or malicious language is
likely to fall outside of the protection of the Section 7.125
To determine whether an employee's conduct loses protection under
the opprobrious prong, the Board established a four-factor test in Atlantic Steel

1'
See, e.g., NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1962) (discussing workers
joining together to walkout in protest of freezing working conditions).
119

KIM MOODY, AN INJURY TO ALL: THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN UNIONISM 346 (1988)

(recognizing the prevalence of this saying across labor movements, and arguing that it represents
a labor ethic that "takes social responsibility for all working people").
120
See infra Part II.C.
121
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2791 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (finding use for an adage that entered scholarly legal discourse in the context of free
speech in Zechariah Chafee, Jr.'s article Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932,
957 (1919)).
122
See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2013). For all the employee rights granted under Section 7, the text
also limits employees' rights to specific examples and a catchall: "'self-organization'; forming,
joining, or assisting labor organizations; and bargaining collectively through representativesand to engaging in 'other concerted activities' for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection." Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 494 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), enforced sub
nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
123
Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979).

124
NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346
U.S. 464, 472 (1953).
125
See id.; see also Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 746, 748-49 (2001)
(distinguishing cases where opprobrious language was impulsive or provoked, finding them not
to lose protection).
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judiciary and the public in the analysis.1 27 This test is
"generally applied to an employee who has made public outbursts against a
supervisor."l 28 To determine whether the speech is protected, the Board has
considered the following four factors: "(1) the place of the discussion; (2) the
subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee's outburst; and
(4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer's unfair
labor practice." 29
Courts use the test established in NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229,
30
IBEW (Jefferson Standard)o
to determine whether
employees'
communications constitute a "sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the quality
of [a] company's product and its business policies, in a manner reasonably
calculated to harm the company's reputation and reduce its income." To
determine whether concerted activity remains protected under the principles of
Jefferson Standard, the Board set forth a two-part test: (1) the communication
must be related to an ongoing labor dispute between employer and employee;
and (2) "the communication [must] not [be] so disloyal, reckless or maliciously
untrue as to lose the Act's protection.',131 Because these standards apply to all
employee communications in the context of concerted action, they also apply to
similar circumstances, analogous electronic communications, and in the context
social media.
Co.1

26

to guide the

D. The NLRB's Positionon Analogous Modalities of Communication
Before exploring how the existing precedent of the rule of protected
concerted activity applies to social media and postulating on its future, it is
valuable to look at how the Board has treated other forms of communication in
the workplace. Generally, state laws grant employers a "basic property right" to
"regulate and restrict employee use of company property." 3 2 However, in a
126
245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). In Atlantic Steel, the Board disagreed with the ALJ and
found that although an employee called his supervisor a "lying s.o.b.," as he was discussing a
grievance, the employee's "offhand complaint" was not protected activity. Id. at 817. Therefore,
after considering the four-factor test, the Board concluded, that the employee was engaged in
protected concerted activity. Id. at 814, 816.
127
Id. at 816.
128
See AGC Memorandum 1, supra note 9.
129
Ad. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. at 816.
130
346 U.S. 464, 471 (1953) (introducing what is now the well-settled Jefferson Standard
test). In this case, employee-technicians disparaged the quality of the employer's product by
disseminating handbills that failed to mention the ongoing labor dispute. Id. at 466-68. The
Board found that the employees were fired for cause, and the Court affirmed the Board's original
holding. Id. at 475-78.
1'
MasTec Advanced Techs., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 17, *6 (July 21, 2011) (recognizing the twopart test).
132
See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663-64 (6th Cir. 1983).
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line of recent decisions, the Board has struggled with the application of this
property right analysis when applied to electronic communications.' 3 3 As
discussed further below, 34 in Purple Communications, Inc.,'" the Board
recently overturned its prior holding on a question of first impression-whether
employees have a right to use the employer's email system for Section 7
purposes-and held that employees have a presumptive right to use their
employer's email system to exercise their Section 7 rights if they had
previously been granted access to the email system for work purposes.' 3 ' These
recent decisions regarding electronic communications may seem more
analogous in the context of social media, but looking at the Board's prior
precedent as to other forms of communication also provides useful guidance.
As discussed above, it is well-established that employees' "time
outside working hours, whether before or after work, or during luncheon or rest
periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes without unreasonable
restraint, although the employee is on company property. "37 Yet, as discussed
above, some restrictions do exist as to employees' use of company property
during that time, even for purposes generally protected under Section 7.
Considering various forms of communication under the framework
established in the seminal case Republic Aviation,'3 9 the Board has recognized
that an employer's property interests outweigh employees' exercise of their
statutory right to communicate for purposes of organizing under the following
circumstances: employees' use of their employer's television to show union
videos in the break room,1 4 0 employees' use of their employer's bulletin

13
CompareRegister-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1110 (2007) (holding that "employees have
no statutory right to use [their employer's] e-mail system for Section 7 purposes"), enforced in
relevantpart and remandedsub. nom. Guard Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir 2009),
with Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 2014 WL 6989135, at *1 (2014) (overruling
the holding of Register-Guard).
134

See infra Part V.B.3.

13

361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 2014 WL 6989135 (2014).

136

Id. at *1 (overturning Register-Guardand the contention that the "Board has consistently

held that there is 'no statutory right . . . to use an employer's equipment or media,' as long as the
restrictions are nondiscriminatory" (quoting Register-Guard,351 N.L.R.B. at 1114)).

137
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945) (quoting Peyton
Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943)).
138
See id. at 803 (recognizing the employer's property rights sometime trump an employee's
Section 7 activity).
139
324 U.S. 793; see supraPart III.A.
140
Mid-Mountain Foods, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 229, 230 (2000) (holding that employees had no
statutory right to use the television in the break room to show a pro-union video during non-work
time), enforced, 269 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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boards,141 employees' use of their employer's copy machine,1 4 2 employees' use
of company phones,1 4 3 and employees' use of the company public address
system.'" However, as mentioned above, the Board has recognized a statutory
right for employees to use the employer's email system, so long as they have
already been granted access to email for work purposes.1 45
IV. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN EMPLOYEES' EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE

A number of cases where employees have used social media to engage
in concerted activity have been before the Board. Knauz BMW1 4 6 was the
Board's first decision regarding terminations for conduct on social media. In
that case, the Board relied upon the standards recognized in Mushroom
Transportation Co. v. NLRB1 47 and the Meyersl4 8 cases to determine whether
the employee's Facebook post was a conversation that sought to induce group
action. In Knauz, the specific question was whether a BMW salesman's
Facebook posts qualified as protected concerted activity. 149 Two posts were at
issue: one post was about the quality of food provided at a work event and the
other involved photos of the company's Land Rover that a 13-year-old drove
into a pond while under the supervision of a coworker. so The ALJ found that
the employee's Land Rover photos were not protected because they had
nothing to do with the terms and conditions of employment.' 5 ' However, the

141
NLRB v. Southwire Co., 801 F.2d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 1986) ("There is no statutory
right for an employee or a union to use an employer's bulletin board."); Eaton Techs., Inc., 322
N.L.R.B. 848, 853 (1997) (same).
142
Champion Int'l Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 102, 109 (1991) (stating employer has "a basic right
to regulate and restrict employee use of company property," in this case, a copy machine).
143
Churchill's Supermarkets, Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. 138, 155 (1987) ("[A]n employer ha[s]
every right to restrict the use of company telephones to business-related conversations."),
enforced, 857 F.2d 1474 (6th Cir. 1988); Union Carbide Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. 974, 980 (1981)
(employer "could unquestionably bar its telephones to any personal use by employees"),
enforced in relevantpart, 714 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1983).
14
Health Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 134, 135 (1972) (noting that an employer could refuse pro-union
employees to use the public address system to respond to anti-union broadcasts).
14
Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 2014 WL 6989135, at *1 (2014).
146
358 N.L.R.B No. 164 (Sept. 28, 2012).
147
330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964) (holding that conversations alone, without action, may be
protected concerted activity); see infra Part V.B.1 (discussing Mushroom Transportation in
detail).
148
See supra Part II.B; Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), enforced sub
nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
149
Knauz BMW, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 16 at *16.
1so
Id. at *1.
1s1
Id. at *18.
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ALJ found the Facebook postings about the food to be protected because he
had voiced the same concerns in the past and because the food choices could
affect the employee's commission from the sale of luxury vehicles at the
event.15 2 Therefore, the ALJ considered it to be a legitimate gripe that could
affect the terms and conditions of employment of all employees. However, the
Board punted on review and decided the case on narrow grounds, finding no
reason to address the posts about the food because the post with the Land Rover
photos was sufficient to terminate his employment. 15 3
In another case, Three D, LLC,1 54 one employee expressed her
discontent with her employer via Facebook because she owed money in taxes
and blamed it on incorrect tax withholding calculations by one of the owners of
Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille.' 55 Other employees joined in the exchange,
which became rather colorful.1 56 At one point, an employee referred to the
owner as "[s]uch an asshole."' 57 The Board reviewed the case under Jefferson
Standard and Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,'58 and found that the
discharges were unlawful because the employees were discussing workplace
complaints. 5 9 Although the comments were colorfully critical, they did not
disparage the employer's product.160
Further, many employers create social media policies that employees
are required to follow.161 In several cases, the Board has addressed these and
similar policies that act to chill employees' exercise of their Section 7 rights. 62
Generally, the policies must be pointedly crafted and not overly broad or
ambiguous for two reasons: (1) so that a reasonable employee would not
believe that the policy prohibited him from discussing statutorily protected
communications such as wages, benefits, or other terms and conditions of

152

Id. at *16.

153

Id. at *1.

154

361 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (Aug. 22, 2014).

155

Id. at *1-2.

Id. at *2. The initiating employee posted on Facebook: "Maybe someone should do the
owners of Triple Play a favor and buy it from them. They can't even do the tax paperwork
correctly!!! Now I OWE money. . . Wtfl!!!" Id. Other employees, and even customers, chimed
in, saying things like "I FUCKING OWE MONEY TOO!" and "You owe them money... that's
fucked up." Id.
157
Id
158
383 U.S. 53 (1966).
159
Three D, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31 at *7.
156

160

Id

See, e.g., Gavin Appleby & Philip L. Gordon, NLRB Post Frightening Message in
Facebook Case, LITTLER (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.littler.com/nlrb-posts-frightening-messagefacebook-case.
162
See, e.g., Hoot Winc, LLC, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (Sept. 1, 2015); Lily Transp. Corp., 362
N.L.R.B. No. 54 (Mar. 30, 2015).
161
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employment, even with nonemployees and (2) so that failure to limit the scope
of such policies by expressly exempting privileges granted by Section 7 does
not mislead employees.' 63 In light of these requirements, the Board and the
courts have shown a proclivity to strike down employer social media policies
that are ambiguous and could be reasonably read by an employee to be coercive
or have a chilling effect on the employees' exercise of their Section 7 rights. 1
For example, in Knauz BMW, the social media policy in the employee
handbook read as follows:
(b) Courtesy: Courtesy is the responsibility of every employee.
Everyone is expected to be courteous, polite and friendly to our
customers, vendors and suppliers, as well as to their fellow
employees. No one should be disrespectful or use profanity or
any other language which injures the image or reputation of the
Dealership. 16
The Board agreed with the ALJ's finding that the policy in the
employee handbook violated Section 8(a)(1). Although it does not explicitly
prohibit Section 7 activity, a reasonable employee could read the "courtesy"
rule to restrict the exercise of their Section 7 rights: to "object to their working
conditions and seek the support of others in improving them."166
The guidance of prior precedent in the context of social media and
electronic communications poses the Board with the challenge of applying a
general doctrine to another specific form of communication. However, social
media is different. Employer property concerns in this form are practically
moot in light of the decision in Purple Communications, and there is a
colorable argument that social media communication should be treated as
electronic communication with even greater protections. The same tests that
determine the extent of protection based upon the content of the
communication apply to concerted action in social media.
V. ANALYSIS: MAY THE ODDS BE EVER IN THE EMPLOYER'S FAVOR?

The success of the labor movement can be attributed to one general
principle: solidarity. Unlike most institutions in a predominantly capitalist
society, communal values are central to the philosophy and success of the labor
movement. 67 The manifestation of solidarity in the workplace is the action of
163

See Hoot Winc, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 2 at *2, *4; Lily Transp. Corp., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 54 at

*3.
16
Knauz BMW, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, *2 (Sept. 28, 2012) (citing Flex Frac Logistics, LLC,
358 N.L.R.B. No. 127, *2 (Sept. 28, 2012), enforced, 746 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2014)).
165
Id. at *1.
166

Id.

167

See Lynd, supra note 40, at 1423.
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one employee spurred by the grievance of another.16 8 This is the base for any
movement to improve the terms and conditions of employment. Diametrically
opposed to the interests of the worker, an employer is generally focused on
individual gains, profits, efficiency, and managerial freedom, not necessarily
the well-being of his employees.' 6 ' Thus, a schism of interests, power, and
coercion exists between the employers and employees.1 7 0 As a result of this
tension, the labor movement arose from the depths of inhumane conditions,
mutual strife, and experiences of workers.171 In turn, the labor movement
spurred the promulgation of legislation protecting the rights of workers. 172
Considering the tumultuous history of the labor movement, it comes as
no surprise that employers are pushing back against employees' use of
electronic communications to organize.' 7 3 In fact, there is a long history of
contentious litigation focused on the precise issue of employee
communications. 174 The distribution of power and influence in the employment
relationship makes one voice much louder than the other. However, as the
Board has demonstrated, the loudest argument is not always the correct
argument. Yet, in this context, the loud argument has been successful enough to
slowly erode much of workers' rights-or their understanding and knowledge
of those rights-rendering the NLRA a toothless and dormant piece of
legislation in the context of nonunionized, private sector employment. 75 Thus,
the Board and the courts should awaken and reinvigorate the spirit of the
NLRA and its sleeping beauty-the doctrine of concerted activity-through an
employee-focused approach in the context of social media activity, just as the
Board has applied this doctrine to electronic communications in Purple
Communications. 76

See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984).
169
See Julina Guo, A Backgrounder: The Market Basket Strike,
ONLABOR (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://onlabor.org/2014/10/28/a-backgrounder-the-market-basket-strike/
(explaining nonunion
employees organized and informed over 25,000 employees via Facebook and Twitter about the
ouster of a widely admired CEO of Market Basket groceries, which led to widespread protests
and strikes, and eventually the reinstatement of the admired CEO, who eventually bought the
company).
170
See Gottesman, supra note 23, at 76-77 (recognizing an information imbalance between
employers and employees).
171
See supra Part II.A.
172
Our History, supra note 4.
173
See Appleby & Gordon, supra note 161.
174
See supra Part II.B.
168

175

See SLATER, supranote 15, at 199-200.

176

Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 2014 WL 6989135, at *8 (2014).
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The Shift in Worker Organizationand the DisparateDistributionof
Power
[I]nsteadof clamping down on the labor movement, Americans
"should be extremely grateful to unions, " which had given
workers a sense of decency by reducing poor working
conditions "and by doing so have helped the country and all
the workers. "'77

Employers are inherently a much more coercive and powerful force
than employees.178 Further, employers generally share one simple common
goal: to be as profitable as possible. On the other hand, employees' interests are
much more diverse and are subject to the industry in which they work.
Therefore, the collective power and influence possessed by employer
organizations is inherently much greater.179 The number of amici briefs filed in
Purple Communications,80 which is discussed in detail below, is a fitting
example of the disparity in power between employer and employee, the very
thing the NLRA is meant to alleviate. In Purple Communications, there were
12 amici briefs filed in favor of upholding Register-Guard and only 3 that
argued for it to be overturned; yet, the Board rejected the loud argument and
overturned Register-Guard.'
As often seems to be the case, decisions-both legislative and
adjudicative-that restrict employees' exercise of Section 7 rights are
promulgated largely by Republican majority 82 compositions of the NLRB and
anti-union, pro-business legislators who are often out of touch with the reality
and the changing patterns of industrial life.'18 Further, the focus of conservative
177

MAURINE HOFFMAN BEASLEY ET AL., THE ELEANOR ROOSEVELT ENCYCLOPEDIA 297

(Greenwood Press ed. 2001) (quoting First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt).
1'
Lofaso, The Autonomous Dignified Worker, supra note 41, at 41-42; see also Jeffrey M.
Hirsch, Communications Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of
Employee Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1091, 1108-11 (2011) (discussing
informational disparities and asymmetry in the employment relationship).
179
See Lofaso, The Autonomous Dignified Worker, supra note 41, at 47-48.
Iso PurpleCommc'ns, Inc., 2014 WL 6989135, at *2.
181
NLRB Invited Briefs on Employee Use of Employer's Electronic CommunicationSystems,
NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD. (May 1, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/newsstory/nlrb-invites-briefs-employee-use-employers-electronic-communication-systems.
182
See, e.g., Judson MacLaury, A Brief History: The U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. DEPT.
OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/dolhistoxford.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015)
("After the activism of President Wilson there was a sharp reversal in policy by the Republican
Administrations from 1921 to 1933 ... .").
183
See, e.g., Monica Davey, Wisconsin Votes to Limit Collection of Fees by Unions, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/07/us/wisconsin-closer-to-becoming-aright-to-work-state.html?_r-0; see also Right-to-Work Resources, NAT'L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills
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Boards on the rights of the employer misses the mark-the Act protects
employee, not employer, rights, although it may accommodate employer rights
in some instances.1 84 Unfortunately, as discussed in the following section, such
Boards and legislators choose an unworthy scapegoat in the union or the
worker.
B. PoliticalInfluences and Oscillation in BoardPrecedent
Despite what is a facially simple framework, the Board and, in turn, the
courts have had difficulty consistently applying this framework to emerging
modalities of communications and the resulting unique factual
circumstances. 185 Due to the nature of independent regulatory agencies and the
influence of political winds and whims, the Board's interpretation and
application of the Act reflect an obvious and politically associated oscillation.
Thus, at times, litigants and lawyers alike may feel as if they have entered a
fictional, nightmarish jurisdiction replete with moving targets and holographic
safe havens, rather than that of the NLRA and the NLRB. Nonetheless, federal
courts grant deference to the Board's expertise in construing the Act and
determining the reach and bounds of employees' rights under Section 7,186 So
long as that interpretation is reasonable and permissible,' 87 even if it departs
from a long line of Board precedent in earlier cases. Therefore, as
demonstrated, the Board has the opportunity to provide a reasonable,
employee-focused interpretation of protected concerted activity that aligns with
the purpose of the Act and protects the most workers.

.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (noting that 25 states have passed right-to-work laws). But see
Right to Work, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Legislation-and-Politics/State-LegislativeBattles/Ongoing-State-Legislative-Attacks/Right-to-Work (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (noting that
states with right-to-work laws have lower wages and incomes, lower rates of health insurance
coverages, higher poverty, higher infant mortality rates, less investment in education, and higher
workplace fatalities). Compare SLATER, supra note 15, at 199 (noting the influence of political
and lobbying contributions), with Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 364
(2010) (favoring political contributions from corporations who, after all, are people too).
184
See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2013).
185
See Estreicher, supra note 12, at 361-63; supra Parts III.A, III.D (discussing an
employer's right to restrict employees' use of property).
186
See Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001), overruledby IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B
1288, 1288 (2004)) (noting that deference will be granted to the Board's variable interpretations
of the NLRA so long as the interpretation is reasonable); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
187
See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 844 (granting deference to administrative
agencies' reasonable interpretation of the statute they are charged with enforcing).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol118/iss2/9

28

Hogan: Awakening the Spirit of the NLRA: The Future of Concerted Activit
THE FUTURE OF THE NLRA AND SOCIAL MEDIA

2015]

1.

869

Conversation and Individual Speech as Concerted Action

In Mushroom Transportation,'88 the Third Circuit confronted the
question of whether conversations alone may constitute concerted activities
under the Act. Although the court did not find the specific conversations at
issue constituted concerted activity, it recognized that conversations alone,
without action, may be protected concerted activity." 9 In addition to
recognizing that "almost any concerted activity for mutual aid and protection
has to start with some kind of communication,"' 90 the court provided further
guidance in making the determination whether and when a conversation falls
under the protection of the NLRA:
It is not questioned that a conversation may constitute a
concerted activity although it involves only a speaker and a
listener, but to qualify as such, it must appear at the very least
that it was engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing
or preparing for group action or that it had some relation to
group action in the interest of the employees.

'

Activity which consists of mere talk must, in order to
be protected, be talk looking toward group action. If its only
purpose is to advise an individual as to what he could or should
do without involving fellow workers or union representation to
protect or improve his own status or working position, it is an
individual, not a concerted, activity, and, if it looks forward to
no action at all, it is more than likely to be mere "griping." 9
The notion that conversations alone may constitute concerted activity
was reaffirmed by the Board and approved by the Fourth Circuit in OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRBl 92 : the "activity of a single employee in
enlisting the support of his fellow employees for their mutual aid and protection
is as much 'concerted activity' as is ordinary group activity."'9 3
The trend of increasingly broad interpretations of employees' rights
under Section 7-specifically, what constitutes concerted activity-culminated
with the decision in Alleluia Cushion Co.,194 where the Board expanded its
interpretation of concerted activity by presuming that coworkers consented to

188

Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1964).

189

Id.
Id.
Id.

190
191

Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365-66 (4th Cir. 1969).
193
Id. at 1365.
194
Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1001 (1975), overruled by Prill v. NLRB, 755
F.2d 941, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
192
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the petitioner's activities when he spoke out about lack of safety precautions in
the workplace. 19 5 The Board found that "in the absence of any evidence that
fellow employees disavow such representation, we will find an implied consent
thereto and deem such activity to be concerted."1 9 6 In Alleluia, an employee
complained of "safety conditions, including the lack of instruction regarding
chemicals used in production, the absence of protective guards on machines,
his inability to communicate safety instructions to the majority of employees
who were Spanish-speaking, and the absence of first aid stations, eyewash
stations, and an overall safety program," and, eventually, he filed a complaint
with the state Occupational Safety & Heath Administration ("OSHA")
office. 19 7 The Board found the employee's actions to constitute protected
concerted activity by inferring the consent of his coworkers.' 9 8 Years later, the
Reagan Board narrowed this broadly inclusive framework in Meyers and its
progeny. 199
Later, the Board departed from Alleluia in its decision in Meyers I,
reasoning that the approach to concerted activity in Alleluia did "not comport
with the principles inherent in Section 7."200 Rather, the Meyers I Board drew
from earlier cases in which the court interpreted the meaning of concerted
activity to require "interaction among employees" 2 0 1 in an effort to establish a
comprehensive definition.202 However, even the Meyers I Board had the
foresight to caution, that its "comprehensive definition" was "by no means
exhaustive,"203 and that "the question of whether an employee engaged in
concerted activity is, at its heart, a factual one." 204

19
196

197
198

Id. at 1000.
Id
Id at 999.

Id at 1000.

199
See Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941
(D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, Meyers H1, 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), enforced sub nom. Prill v. NLRB,
835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
200
Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496.
201
Id at 494 (citing Traylor-Pamco, 154 N.L.R.B. 380 (1965)) ("There is not even the
proverbial iota of evidence that there was any consultation between the two in the matter, that
either relied in any measure on the other in making his refusal, or that their association in
refusing [to submit to the condition of employment they were opposing] was anything but
accidental."); Cont'l Mfg. Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 255, 257 (1965) (finding that a letter purporting
to convey the grievances of a majority of employees did not constitute concerted action because
there was "no evidence that the criticisms in the letter reflected the views of other employees, nor
is there evidence that the letter was intended to enlist the support of other employees").
202
Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496-97.
203
Id
204
Id. at 497.
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Although Meyers I and Meyers II propounded a more narrow definition
of concerted activity than Alleluia, the Board, and later the court, did recognize
two important, related rules that are central to employees' right to engage in
concerted activity: (1) "Manifestly, the guarantees of Section 7 of the Act
extend to concerted activity which in its inception involves only a speaker and
a listener, for such activity is an indispensable preliminary step to employee
self-organization"; 20 5 and (2) "actions an individual takes in attempting to
enforce a provision of an existing collective-bargaining agreement are, in
effect, grievances within the framework of that agreement,"206 and are protected
as concerted activity.207 Although the Interboro doctrine was confirmed in
NLRB v. City DisposalSystems Inc.,208 the Board distinguished Interboro from
Alleluia noting that the assertion of a statutory right on behalf of fellow
employees is not granted the same protection as when an employee asserts a
contract right under the collective-bargaining agreement. 2 0 9 This distinction of
the superiority of a contract right over a statutory right is a difficult one to
reconcile in the post-Lochner era.210
In further distancing itself from the Alleluia Board, the Reagan Board
in Meyers contended that the previous standard would essentially allow the
adjudicative body to employ a highly subjective inquiry in an effort to
determine the theoretical actions of other employees when a single employee
asserts a statutory right individually-perhaps a right known only to him
among his peers.2 11 So, the Board reasoned, that even in the face of relevant
legislation, for an individual to engage in concerted activity alone on the behalf
of his coworkers, the inquiry must be based on the "observable evidence of
group action to see what men and women in the workplace in fact chose as an
issue about which to take some action." 2 12 The inquiry should not "question[]
whether the purpose of the activity was one it wished to protect and, if so, if

Id. at 494 (quoting Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313, 1314 (1951)).
206
Id. at 496.
207
See Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966), enforced, NLRB v.
Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 496 (2d Cir. 1967) (recognizing an individual
employee's honest and reasonable invocation of a collectively bargained right to be concerted
activity), aff'd, NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 840 (1984).
208
City DisposalSys., 465 U.S. at 840.
209
Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 496-98.
210
See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down rules limiting
bakers to 10 hour days and 60 hour work weeks and laying the foundation for an era of unfettered
economic freedom in which contract and property rights were paramount).
211
Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 495-96. But see Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 330
F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
212
Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 495.
205
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[sic] then deemed the activity 'concerted,' without regard to its form."213 The
Board found such an inquiry to be an insufficient basis to consider an activity
"concerted." 2 14 In addition to these limits placed on Alleluia, the Board
continued to narrow employee rights to communicate. As shown below,
employee-focused precedent fell victim to what has come to be known as the
"September Massacre," a collection of 2007 amendments and decisions that
eroded workers' rights. 215 For example, as discussed further below, the
interpretations in Register-Guard216 seemed to capsize established precedent,
but in a recent Board decision, the ship seems to have righted itself.217
2. Narrowing Employees' Rights to Communicate: Register-Guard' 1 8
In a restrictive decision, the Seventh Circuit reversed the part of the
Board's holding in Flemming Cos. 2 19 that granted employees the right to use
their employer's communication equipment-bulletin boards in this case-for
Section 7 purposes if the employer had already granted them the right to use it
for other non-work related purposes. 2 20 The Seventh Circuit denied
enforcement of the Board's decision and proffered the opinion that union
solicitations are different than personal emails or other personal non-work use
of the employer's email. 22 1 Therefore, under this interpretation, an employer
could distinguish between employees' various types of non-work activity
conducted through its email, or on other equipment, and choose part and parcel

&

213
Id. "[W]e are not empowered to correct all immorality or even illegality arising under the
total fabric of Federal and state laws." Id. at 499.
214
Id. at 496.
215
See Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of Recognition,
62 ME. L. REV. 199, 201-02 (2010) [hereinafter Lofaso, Persistence of Union Repression].
216
Register-Guard,351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), enforced in part, remanded in part sub nom.
Guard Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also infra Part V.B.2.
217
See generally Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 2014 WL 6989135, at *17
(2014) (overturning Register-Guard,351 N.L.R.B. 1110).
218
Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1110, enforced in relevant part, remanded in part sub
nom. Guard Publ'g Co., 571 F.3d at 57 (holding that "employees [have] no statutory right to use
the[ir] [employer]'s e-mail system for Section 7 matters").
219
336 N.L.R.B. 192 (2001), aff'd in part, rev'd in partsub nom. Fleming Cos. v. NLRB, 349
970 (7th Cir. 2003).
968,
F.3d
220
See id. at 975; see also Guardian Indus. Corp., 313 N.L.R.B. 1275, 1275 (1994), enforced,
Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 1995). "Ifan employer allows employees
to use its communications equipment for non-work related purposes, it cannot validly prohibit
employee use of communications equipment for Section 7 purposes." D. Michael Reilly
Kirsten G. Daniels, Employees' Use of E-mail for Union Support Purposes, 2008 HuMAN

RESOURCES 159.

221

GuardianIndus. Corp., 49 F.3d 317.
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It is certainly conceivable that such

discretionary employer power will have a chilling effect on employees'
freedom and willingness to engage in protected activity guaranteed by the
rights granted in Section 7.
In Register-Guard, the three-to-two Board majority ruled that
employers had the privilege to limit employees' use of company e-mail systems
for non-work related purposes, including union solicitations and calls to
organize, so long as such limitations do not discriminate against activity
protected under the NLRA. 2 23 In reaching this decision, the Board-seemingly
arbitrarily-applied a new standard to determine whether an employer has
violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by discriminatorily enforcing its
policies.22 4 The new standard seems to be a misguided interpretation of the
NLRA, leading to a standard that could be considered labor law's separate but
equal doctrine22 : discrimination is the "unequal treatment of equals." 2 2 6

Register-Guard involved employees' use of the employer's personal
property (e-mail) rather than use of the employer's real property as in Republic
Aviation (union solicitation on employer's property). 227 However, despite the
guidance of the basic principles of property law and the Supreme Court's
holding and reasoning in Republic Aviation, the Register-Guard Board
conflated the perceived need for greater protection of an employer's real
property interest with the lesser protection of personal property interests and
extended dicey precedent to allow an employer's personal property interest to
usurp employees' Section 7 rights to communication and collective action in
the workplace.2 28 Further, the decision to restrict employees' use of electronic
communication frustrates the central purpose of the NLRA and the policies of

222

Id.

Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1110, enforced in part, remanded in part
sub nom.
GuardPubl'g Co., 571 F.3d at 57 (holding that "employees have no statutory right to use the[ir]
[employer]'s e-mail system for Section 7 matters").
224
Register-Guard,351 N.L.R.B. at 1110 ("We have decided to modify the Board's approach
in discriminatory enforcement cases to clarify that discrimination under the Act means drawing a
distinction along Section 7 lines.").
225
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
226
See Fleming Cos. v. NLRB, 349 F.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2003), granting enforcement
in
part, denying in partto Fleming Cos., 336 N.L.R.B. 192 (2001) (distinguishing between personal
non-work-related posts and organizational posts, such as union related posts); see also Guardian
Indus. Corp., 49 F.3d at 319-20, denying enforcement to 313 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1994) (same). The
Register-GuardBoard adopted the Seventh Circuit's "unequal treatment of equals" definition of
discrimination. Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1117.
227
Register-Guard,351 N.L.R.B. at 1115.
228
See GuardPubl'gCo., 571 F.3d at 59-60.
223
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the NLRB: to protect the statutory rights of all employees to engage in
collective action, not to protect employer's property rights.2
3.

A Change of the (Register) Guard: Purple Communications2 30

Purple Communications provided communication services for
individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing through sign language
interpretation during video calls. 2 31 To provide this service, employees used
"company-provided computers located at their workstations."232 Union
elections were taking place at a number of the employer's locations. The NLRB
issued a complaint alleging that the employer had committed unfair labor
practices by maintaining two rules that interfered with employees' section 7
rights: (1) a rule prohibiting employees from "[c]ausing, creating or
participating in a disruption of any kind during working hours on Company
property" and (2) a policy that prohibiting employees' use of their employer's
email system for "any nonbusiness reason."
An ALJ found in favor of the General Counsel as to the first rule
prohibiting disruptions.23 3 However, the ALJ found the electronic
234
When the case
communications policy lawful based on Register-Guard.
reached the Board, it deferred its review of the AL's decision as to Purple
Communications' electronic communications policy on its merits pending the
Board's review of solicited party and amici briefs addressing that issue.235 In its
229
Hirsch, supra note 178, at 1151 ("[T]he regulation of workplace discourse has become so
far adrift that the NLRB now views e-mail as an affront to employer interests, rather than a low-

cost, effective means for employees to exercise their right to collective action."); see also

William R. Corbett, Awakening Rip Van Winkle: Has the NationalLabor Relations Act Reached
a Turning Point?, 9 NEV. L.J. 247, 252 (2009) (stating that Register-Guard"elevated employers'
property interests over employees' rights, and interpreted the NLRA in a restrictive way that
threatens to make it irrelevant and obsolescent").
230
Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 2014 WL 6989135 (2014) (listing Docket
Activity on http://www.nlrb.gov/case/2l -CA-095151).
231
Id. at *2.
232
Id. at *17.
233
Board Decision at 19, Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (2014) (No. 21-CA095151) ("The Employer has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act since June 19, 2012, by
maintaining a rule prohibiting employees from '[c]ausing, creating, or participating in a
disruption of any kind during working hours on Company property' because that rule creates an
overly broad restriction that interferes with the Section 7 rights of employees to engage in union
and/or protected concerted activity.").
234
Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 2014 WL 6989135, at *3.
235
See Board Decision at I n.3, Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (2014) (No.
21-CA-095151) ("Accordingly, today's [September 24, 2014,] decision does not address
Register-Guardor Purple's electronic communications policy on the merits."); see also Board's
Formal Notice to Parties/Public at 1-2, Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (2014)
(No. 21-CA-095151) NLRB Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, Apr. 30, 2014,
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invitation to file briefs, the Board provided five questions to guide the amicis'
analysis of the issue.236
After reviewing the amici briefs,237 the Board held that "employee use
of email for statutorily protected communications on nonworking time must
presumptively be permitted by employers who have chosen to give employees
access to their email systems." 23 8 Importantly, the Board stated that "[i]n
overruling Register-Guard, we seek to make '[n]ational labor policy . .
responsive to the enormous technological changes that are taking place in our
society. "239 However, in his dissent, Board Member Johnson contended that
employees should not have a right to use employer email to communicate
because "most employees already have access to technology which they can
use to communicate with one another about protected concerted activity
without needing to use their employer's business email system." 24 0 Board

http://www.nlrb.gov/case/2 1-CA-095151?page=2 (Briefs were due by June 16, 2014) (stating the
Board had formally invited parties and interested amici to file briefs for it to consider in deciding
whether the Register-Guardrule that "employees have no statutory right to use the Employer's email system for Section 7 purposes" and "adopt a rule that employees who are permitted to use
their employer's email for work purposes have the right to use it for Section 7 activity, subject
only to the need to maintain production and discipline").
236
The five questions presented were as follows:
[1] Should the Board reconsider this conclusion in Register Guard that
employees do not have a statutory right to use their employer's email system
(or other electronic communications system) for Section 7 purposes? [2] If
the Board overrules Register Guard, what standard(s) of employee access to
the employer's electronic communications systems should be established?
What restrictions, if any, may an employer place on such access, and what
factors are relevant to such restrictions? [3] In deciding the above questions,
to what extent and how should the impact on the employer of employees' use
of an employer's electronic communications technology affect the issue? [4]
Do employee personal electronic devices (e.g., phones, tablets), social media
accounts, and/or personal email accounts affect the proper balance to be
struck between employer's rights and employees' Section 7 rights to
communicate about work-related matters? If so, how? [5] Identify any other
technological issues concerning email or other electronic communications
systems that the Board should consider in answering the foregoing questions,
including any relevant changes that may have occurred in electronic
communications technology since Register Guard was decided. How should
these affect the Board's decision?
NLRB Notice and Invitation to File Briefs, Apr. 30, 2014, http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.
aspx/0903 1d45816el3ce.
237
The amici briefs were overwhelmingly arguing for adherence to the Register-Guard
holding; in fact, only 3 of 15 argued for Register-Guardto be overturned. See supra note 181 and
accompanying text.
238
Purple Commc'ns, 2014 WL 6989135, at *1.
239
Id. at *17 (quoting Register-Guard,351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121 (2007), enforced in relevant
part, remanded in part sub nom. Guard Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
240
Id. (Johnson, B.M., dissenting).
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Member Johnson's contention is a perfect example of a lofty jurist being out of
touch with the reality and demographics of the workplace.24 1
C.

The Lost Purpose

Section 7 rightS 24 2 are the core of employees' rights under the NLRA
and the heart of the Act.243 Fighting to stymie employees' ability to
communicate-including communication through social media-about the
terms and conditions of employment is a continuation of the battle against the
workman, the laborer. Some have even predicted that the protection of
concerted activity in Section 7 of the NLRA would "[i]mpair labor's rights in
the long run, however much its authors may intend precisely the contrary." 24
Perhaps this has been shown to be true, as illustrated above, when employer
interests usurp the rights of employees. 24 5 The oscillation of the Board's
precedent through the years often correlates with changing political tides.246
241
See The Web at 25 in the U.S., PEw RES. CTR. 19, 31-32 (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.pew
internet.org/files/2014/02/PIP_25th-anniversary-of-the-Web_0227141.pdf
(describing survey
results showing that, among 82% of respondents who used the Internet or e-mail on a given day,
44% of them went online from work); Table 8: Locations Outside the Home Where the Internet
Is Accessed, by Selected Characteristics: Total, Urban, Rural, Principal City, 2010, NAT'L
TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 28, 2011, 3:47 PM), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/data/
CPS201OTables/tll_8.txt (showing results of large survey in which 40% of all respondentsincluding those who do not use Internet at all-access the Internet at their workplace); Table 1:
Persons Using the Internet in and Outside the Home, by Selected Characteristics:Total, Urban,
Rural, Principal City, 2010, NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 28, 2011, 3:39 PM),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntialdata/CPS2010Tables/t 11 1.txt
(showing
that
among
respondents who report using the Internet anywhere (in Table 1), 56% report doing so at their
workplace); see also Richard B. Freeman, From the Webbs to the Web: The Contribution of the
Internet to Reviving Union Fortunes, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. REs. 2-5, 10-11 (2005),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wll298.pdf (discussing unions' increased use of Internet); cf supra
text accompanying notes 95-99.
242
See, e.g., Tradesmen Int'l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460 (2002). "Section 7" refers to the public law
section number of the NLRA, now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2013) ("Section 7 rights" is the
colloquial language used by the courts, the National Labor Relations Board, and labor attorneys
when referring to employees' rights under 29 U.S.C. § 157).
243
Lee Modjeska, The Reagan NLRB, Phase 1, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 95, 108 (1985).
244
CLETUS E. DANIEL, THE ACLU AND THE WAGNER ACT 34 (Cornell Univ. ed. 1989)
(expressing similar concerns to Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins and Chairman of the Labor
Advisory Board Leo Wolman); id. at 71 (quoting Chairman of the ACLU's subcommittee on
labor and policy, Mary Van Kleeck's letter to Senator Robert Wagner: "I have doubts about the
inevitable trends of [the Act's] administration."); id. at 75 (quoting a letter from ACLU Director
Roger Baldwin to Senator David Walsh on Mar. 20, 1934).
245
See supra Part V.B. See generally Lofaso, Persistence of Union Repression, supra note
215, at 201-02 (demonstrating, through the "September Massacre" of 2007, that in spite of the
progressive nature of Section 7, workers' rights have been eroded by congressional amendments,
interpretations by the courts and the Board-the very agency tasked with protecting workers).
246
See supra Part V.B.
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Thus, at times, one cannot help but think that the Board has misapprehended
the root purpose of the NLRA and allowed the weeds of politics to take hold.247
Indeed, numerous Board and Court decisions contravene the purpose
and spirit of the NLRA, granting credence to the early prophecies of ACLU
critics who expressed concerns about the administration and practical
implications of the Act.248 Specifically, provisions regarding concerted activity
have been construed in a way that would lead a layman, ignorant of labor law
and legislative history, to think that the NLRA's purpose is to protect
employers from the trouble-causing and anti-capitalist unions and employees
who, in reality, are simply fighting an uphill battle for a living wage.249 Some
scholars have portrayed an even more dismal outlook for the nonunionized
employee, positing that "[t]here exists today a haphazard labor law for workers
who do not have an exclusive bargaining representative." 2 50
VI. THE SOLUTION-DENTURES FOR AN OLD ACT: A LIBERAL APPLICATION
OF THE PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY DOCTRINE WILL RESTORE THE
LOST BITE AND SPIRIT OF THE NLRA2 51

Technology has forced past changes in labor law,2 52 and the
jurisprudence-like labor, like society-must also evolve along with the entity
it regulates to achieve its purpose.2 53 Simply because workers die on the job
less often, and no longer live in tenement housing, does not mean that labor
disputes are any less relevant. 254 Industry will often seek to stay ahead of or
See supra Part V.B.2 (discussing cases where the Board narrowly applied the rule of
concerted activity and/or diminished workers' rights under the NLRA).
248
See DANIEL, supra note 244, at 34, 71, 74.
249
See Drew Desilver, US. Income Inequality, on Rise for Decades, Is Now Highest Since
1928, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/05/u-sincome-inequality-on-rise-for-decades-is-now-highest-since-1928/ (noting that the last time
income inequality has been so high was before the Act was passed); see also Ross Eisenbrey,
Middle Class Incomes Suffer Without Collective Bargaining, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.epi.org/publication/middle-class-incomes-suffer-without-collective-bargaining/; Sean
McElwee, One Big Reason for Voter Turnout Decline and Income Inequality: Smaller Unions,
AMERICAN PROSPECT (Jan. 30, 2015), http://prospect.org/article/one-big-reason-voter-turnoutdecline-and-income-inequality-smaller-unions.
247

250

See Gottesman, supra note 23, at 68.

251

MARY ANDERSON, WOMAN AT WORK: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARY ANDERSON
AS TOLD

TO MARY N. WINSLOw 41 (Univ. of Minn. Press ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1951) ("This is the spirit

that is back of all the great struggles of the workers to improve their working conditions. Liberty
and freedom for collective bargaining is what they want and it is what they must have.").
252

See supra Part III.A.

253

See supra Parts II.A., V.C.

254

See generally, Labor Dispute, CHI. TRIBUNE, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/keyword/

labor-dispute (last visited Nov 6, 2015) (listing numerous recent labor disputes taking place
across the country).
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manipulate regulations with one goal in mind: profits.2 55 This, is a constant
tension between the employee and the employer. s6 Therefore, the NLRA is as
relevant as ever in the campaign for workers' rights. Even in the face of
declining union membership, the "Rip Van Winkle" 257 of administrative law
has the possibility to awaken with its spirit reinvigorated by the sleeping
beauties of the NLRA. 2 58 To achieve these goals-protection of workers' rights
and relevance of the NLRA in today's workplace-the Board and the courts
should construe the protections of concerted action doctrine through a lens
consistent with the goal and purpose of the act: a lens focused on workers'
rights. Just as our society, our economy, and our culture evolves, the NLRA,
although an aged and largely dormant statute, must evolve to meet the needs of
today's workplace and acknowledge the social media presence of employees.
This evolution requires an employee-focused interpretation and the inclusion of
appropriate electronic communications and social media under the doctrine of
concerted activity. 2 59
Part VI.A demonstrates the Board's proclivity to interpret NLRA
jurisprudence consistent with this argument for expanded workers-rights in the
context of social media. Further, Part VI.B argues that the changes in the
demographics of the workplace and in how workers organize lend support for
this interpretation of concerted activity. Then, it goes beyond that recognition
of applicability and takes the analysis one step further to suggest that as

See, e.g., Chris Hamby, Black Lung Surges Back in Coal Country, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (July 8, 2012), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/07/08/9293/black-lung-surgesback-coal-country (discussing the resurgence of black lung in spite of tighter regulations on
respirable dust-to be clear, industry-reported data of miners' exposure to dust is generally
below the standards required by the regulation, which have been scientifically proven to be the
threshold to eliminate black lung, leaving no doubt that miners are exposed to much higher dust
levels as evinced by the resurgence of black lung).
255

256

See supra Parts II, IV.

Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121 (2007) (Liebman & Walsh, B.M., dissenting in
part) ("[T]he NLRB has become the 'Rip Van Winkle of administrative agencies.' Only a Board
that has been asleep for the past 20 years could .. . contend, as the majority does, that an e-mail
system is a piece of communications equipment to be treated just as the law treats bulletin
boards, telephones, and pieces of scrap paper." (quoting NLRB v. Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d 1137,
1142 (7th Cir. 1992))).
258
See supra Part III (discussing how largely dormant provisions of the NLRA apply to
nonunion employees).
259
See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2013) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
257

and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers offullfreedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection."(emphasis added)).
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workers' rights hang in the balance, a broad interpretation of concerted activity
is the key to the future of employees' rights under the NLRA.
A.

The BoardHas Shown a Willingness to Take the Jurisprudencein this
Direction

The explosion of technology, particularly the growth of electronic
communication and social media, over the past several decades has forced once
unthinkable forms of communication to squeeze into what is already a
convoluted framework that, under the varying dispositions of the NLRB, often
results in inconsistent interpretations of the NLRA.260 Such oscillation and
uncertainty does not make clear-for employees, employers, and unions
alike-where the proverbial line is at any given time or where it will be drawn
in the future, even in regards to traditional forms of communication.2 61
Therefore, the present analysis for applying the traditional framework for
concerted and protected activity under NLRA is lacking when applied to the
dynamic and relatively unfamiliar legal nature of social media.
Opportunity knocks; labor jurisprudence regarding electronic
communications and social media is in its infancy, and now is the time to set
the employee-focused precedent that will protect employees' rights to organize
outside of the aging unions and union construct. Evidence exists that the Board
is willing to refocus its efforts on employees' rights in regard to electronic
communication.2 62 For example, in the face of an overwhelming number of
amici briefs arguing for employers' interests, the Board decided Purple
Communications in congruence with the lone wolf, the brief in support of an
inclusive, employee-focused interpretation of protected concerted activity.263
Social media provides an opportunity for the Board to establish
precedent that awakens the "Rip Van Winkle" 264 spirit of the NLRA and
develop one of its best kept secrets and most underutilized aspect: the

260
See The Web at 25 in the U.S., supra note 241, at 19, 31-32 (describing survey results
showing that, among 82% of respondents who used the Internet or e-mail on a given day, 44% of
them went online from work); Table 8: Locations Outside the Home Where the Internet is
Accessed, by Selected Characteristics:Total, Urban, Rural, PrincipalCity, 2010, supra note 241
(showing results of large survey in which 40% of all respondents-including those who do not
use Internet at all-access the Internet at their workplace); Table 1: Persons Using the Internet in
and Outside the Home, by Selected Characteristics:Total, Urban, Rural, PrincipalCity, 2010,
supra note 241 (showing that among respondents who report using the Internet anywhere (in
Table 1), 56% report doing so at their workplace); see also Freeman, supra note 241 (discussing
unions' increased use of Internet); see also supra Parts III.B-C, IV.
261
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567-68 (1978).
262
Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 2014 WL 6989135, at *1 (2014).
263
Id at *17
264
Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121 (2007) (Liebman & Walsh, B.M., dissenting in
part).
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protection of the nonunion employee. 2 65 The Board must not succumb to a
similar slumber from reality 2 66 and embrace various types of social media
communications and activity as protected concerted action. The Board showed
promise of reaching for such an ideal in its Purple Communications decision
and adopted the logic of Board Members Liebman and Walsh's Register-Guard
dissent. 67 Now, "employee use of email for statutorily protected
communications on nonworking time must presumptively be permitted by
employers who have chosen to give employees access to their email
systems."2 68
The traditional rights analysis-pitting property rights against First
Amendment rights-misses the mark when applied to concerted action in the
realm of social media. It is worth noting, again, the distinction between an
employer's real and personal property, the latter of which employers have a
lower expectation of control. 26 Further, if an employer grants an employee use
of real property for work purposes, the employer then has diminished property
right expectations. 27 0 However, as is increasingly the case, this is a moot
concern because individuals can post on social media instantly from a phone or
handheld device. Further, social media platforms do not impose any burden on
the employer's data systems because they merely require an internet connection
to a third-party server. In fact, the use of an employer's computer during nonworking time is so de minimis, that the employer's strongest arguments in
Purple Communications for invoking a property right fall short.27 1

265
See Philip L. Gordon & Lauren K. Woon, United States: Five Recent NLRB Cases Provide
Further Insight on Structuring Employers' Social Media Policies, LITTLER (July 24, 2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/329926/employment+litigation+tribunals/Five+Recent+
NLRB+Cases+Provide+Further+Insight+on+Structuring+Employers+Social+Media+Policies
(last visited Nov. 6, 2015) ("The six cases, decided in the past two months, which resulted in five
losses and only one victory for employers, demonstrate that the NLRB continues to use social
media and other common communications policies as a vehicle to aggressively inject itself into
the non-union workplace as the number of unionized workers continues to diminish.").
266
See generally Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1121 (Liebman & Walsh, B.M., dissenting
in part) (stating that "the NLRB has become the 'Rip Van Winkle of administrative agencies.'
Only a Board that has been asleep for the past 20 years could . . contend, as the majority does,
that an e-mail system is a piece of communications equipment to be treated just as the law treats
bulletin boards, telephones, and pieces of scrap paper." (quoting NLRB v. Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d
1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1992)).
267
See Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 2014 WL 6989135, at *5; Register-Guard,351 N.L.R.B. at
1121 (Liebman & Walsh, B.M., dissenting in part).
268
Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 2014 WL 6989135, at *1.
269
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1956) (discussing the distinction
between the applicable law for employees and nonemployees, and describing balancing test).

270

Id.

Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 NLRB at *17. The briefs in support of employer argued that
use of the employer's email creates an undue burden on the property-the server and data storage
271
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Thus, in the context of social media, any property rights argument by
the employer is attenuated at best.272 Yet, the question of whether an employee
has a right to use an employer's equipment to post on social media remains
undecided. However, for the reasons mentioned above, the purpose and spirit of
the NLRA will be realized if the Board and the courts adopt analogous
reasoning to the decision in Purple Communications: If an employer has
granted an employee access to a personal computer, or similar device, for work
purposes, the employee should be able to use that device during non-working
times to engage in Section 7 activity via social media.27 3
B.

Consideringthe DemographicalChanges in Worker Organization,
ConcertedAction Is the Future of the NLRA

Much to the chagrin of pro-labor advocates, union membership is at
historic lows, 2 74 the demographics of the workforce are changing, 7 the
demographics of labor organization are changing,276 and the workplace is
changing.277 However, many employers see the decline in union membership as
a victory of decades-long pushback and lobbying efforts.27 8 Compared with

functions--of the employer. The Board rejected this argument noting that employee use of their
employer's email system is de minimis use. Id. at n.22.
272
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 325 (Cal. 2003) (holding that the employee did not
violate the employer's property right by speaking from his home through his computer).
273
See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (granting deference to administrative agencies' reasonable interpretation of the statute
they are charged with enforcing); see also MAURICE DOBB, STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF

CAPITALISM 223 (International Publishers ed. 1947) ("The capitalist system presupposes the
complete separation of the labourers from all property in the means by which they can realize
their labour.... The expropriation of the agriculture producer, of the peasant, from the soil is the
basis of the whole process.").
274
Harold Meyerson, IfLabor Dies, What's Next?, AM. PROSPECT, http://prospect.org/article/
if-labor-dies-whats-next (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
275

Id

276

See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND TE

THEORY OF GROUPS 2, 11-12 (Harvard Univ. Press ed. 1965); see also Elinor Ostrum, Collective
Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 6 J. NAT. RES. & ENVTL. L. 236, 243-47 (2014),

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/1 0.1080/19390459.2014.935173;

Steven

Greenhouse,

Workers Organize, but Don't Unionize, to Get Protection Under Labor Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.

6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/business/economy/nonunion-employees-turn-towork-site-committees-for-protection.html?_r-0.
277
See, e.g., supra Parts IV-V.A. (describing how technology has changed the workplace).
278

SLATER, supra note 15, at 199. ("[W]hat is unique about private sector labor relations in

the United States is the extreme hostility of employers. From the use of spies and private armies
from the nineteenth century through the New Deal (and sometimes beyond), which produced the
most violent labor history in the Western World, to the routine expenditure of millions of dollars

today on 'consultants' to defeat organizing drives or destroy existing unions, the tactics that
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other industrialized nations, we have fallen behind when it comes to workers'
rights.2 79 Surely, that is one of many considerations that support an argument
for change and expanded workers' rights.
The workplace is also changing: The office is becoming bigger and
more spread out. Technology has spurred a workforce diaspora. The methods
of worker organization are also changing. The old methods, while still effective
in some work environments, will eventually become ineffective and obsolete.
Social media posts and electronic communications will take the place of doorto-door union solicitation and hand billing.
The labor movement is transforming and lying in wait for meaningful
avenues to change. Employees have organized and prevailed without the
expertise and influence of unions. 2 80 Also, labor organizers are using new
tactics and creative approaches to effectively bargain collectively. 28 1
Movements and organizing campaigns to raise minimum wage are taking place
across the country. Interestingly, these movements of organized workers are
taking place at the same time as more states introduce and pass "right-to-work"

American employers have used to fight unions--extremely aggressive and often marginally legal
at best-have been truly exceptional among industrialized democracies.")
279
Id
280
See, e.g., Guo, supra note 169.
281
See, e.g., Harold Meyerson, The Seeds of a New Labor Movement, Am. PROSPECT (2014),
http://prospect.org/article/labor-crossroads-seeds-new-movement
(discussing the successful
organizing campaign in Seattle that resulted in raising the minimum wage to fifteen dollars).
282
See Shamus Cooke, Oregon Unions Rally for a $15 Minimum Wage, COUNTERPUNCH (Jan.
28, 2015), http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/01/28/oregon-unions-rally-for-a-15-minimumwage/; Bob Mercer, Second Round of Minimum- Wage Fight-anda Bigger Campaign Against
Democrats, RAPID CITY J. (Feb. 5, 2015, 8:09 AM), http://rapidcityjournal.conblog/pierrereview/second-round-of-minimum-wage-fight-and-a-bigger-campaign/article_fef49388-ad4811e4-a9b3-63e486b7b768.html; Meyerson, supra note 281; Katie Taylor, What Franchisees
Could Lose if the Minimum Wage Is Raised, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.
entrepreneur.com/article/230192 (Jim Senegal, Costco CEO, justifying why he pays his
employees in excess of $15 per hour while many corporations pay their workers significantly
less). Compare Allen Young, CalforniaEndowment Funds Ad Campaignfor Higher Minimum
Wage, SACRAMENTO Bus., J. (Feb. 5, 2015, 5:32 AM), http://www.bizjoumals.com/sacramento
/news/2015/02/05/califomia-endowment-ad-higher-wages.html, with Allen Young, Lawmaker
Relaunches Bid for $13 Minimum Wage, SACRAMENTO Bus. J. (Dec. 1, 2014, 2:33 PM),
http://www.bizjoumals.com/sacramento/news/2014/12/01/san-francisco-lawmaker-minimumwage.html, and Allen Young, Business-Backed Opposition to Minimum-Wage Hike Begins to
Form, SACRAMENTO Bus. J. (Feb. 3, 2015, 7:14 AM), http://www.bizjoumals.com/sacramento
/news/2015/02/03/business-backed-opposition-to-minimumwage-hike.html. See generally Bus.
FOR A FAIR MINIMUM WAGE, http://www.businessforafairminimumwage.org/ (last visited Nov. 6,

2015) (listing recent news on fair minimum wage).
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legislation, legislation that erodes support for unions,2 83 and legislation that is
favorable to industry and employers-if not blatantly hostile to workers.284
However, these attacks, public relations campaigns, and political stunts
are clear misrepresentations of the law and misrepresentations of the reality of
unions' role in the workplace. 2 8 5 For example, public sector unions-which are
statutorily precluded from bargaining over wages and benefits-are vilified by
politicians who conflate the facts and the law into a blatant untruth.286
Specifically, under this misrepresentation, public sector unions are blamed for
states' debt and increased taxes.287 Surely, this rhetoric sways public opinion as
to public-sector unions and to unions in general.288 After all, what red-blooded
American is going to stand for his tax money to be appropriated to "lazy
government union workers" who do not work as hard as he does in the private
sector? 289 Further, why should public-sector employees get better benefit
packages when the private sector is reeling from the Great Recession? This
false and toxic rhetoric bleeds into the public perception of private-sector
unions, portraying expertly trained workers as lazy, hand-out-taking leeches
who are taking jobs from hardworking Americans. This view is toxic to
workers' rights and is perpetuated by venomous interests.
Enough barriers exist; employers often oppose, with an ignorant fervor,
employees' attempts to organize.'90 A typical strategy of employers during a
union organizing campaign is to attempt to increase the size of the bargaining

See Anne Marie Lofaso, In Defense of Public-Sector Unions, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 301, 302-03 (2011) [hereinafter Lofaso, Public-Sector Unions] (discussing the movements
in the public sector).
284
See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, Could One of These States be the Next to Pass a Right-to- Work
Law?, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/03/
09/could-one-of-these-states-be-the-next-to-pass-a-right-to-work-law/; Lisa Neff, Raising 2015:
Minimum Wage Hike, Other New Laws Take Effect (Jan. 15, 2015, 2:10 PM), http://www.
wisconsingazette.com/trending-news/raising-2015breakminimum-wage-hike-other-new-lawstake-effect.html.
285
MacLaury, supra note 182; see, e.g., A Brief History: The Department of Labor, U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR (1988), http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/dolhistoxford.htm ("After the
activism of President Wilson there was a sharp reversal in policy by the Republican
Administrations from 1921 to 1933 . . . .").
286
Lofaso, Public-SectorUnions, supra note 283, at 302-03.
287
Id
283

288

Id

289

Id.
Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 1, 9-10, 71 (2000) (describing the methods employers use as a bulwark to worker
collective action, including, but not limited to, retaliation and limiting workplace
communications).
290

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

43

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 118, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW

884

[Vol. 118

unit, knowing that the unit loses its cohesive nature to act concertedly as it
increases in size.291
Just as electronic communications have eased communications for the
general population, effective use of electronic communications and social
media lower the barriers to employee collective action. Social media and
electronic communications are not the panacea for the strife of the workers or
their struggles to organize, but a broad interpretation of the Act comports with
its larger goal: to protect workers' rights.
Solidarity is key, and without
effective communication channels, employees are unaware of the pervasiveness
of their collective concerns.293 Further, barriers to communication impede the
right of all employees to organize for mutual aid and protection.2 94 However,
erecting another barrier to collective action is not the answer.
VII. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST WORKERS' RIGHTS
In addition to the short counter-arguments mentioned throughout this
Note, two arguments are common among employers and deserve some
treatment: (1) worker-focused legislation is bad for business, and (2) social
media has the potential for bad actors and harm to the business. As discussed
throughout this Note, efforts to expand workers' rights are always met with
fervent opposition.29 5 Often, employers cite property rights and increased costs.
However, evidence to the contrary is abundant. 6
Worker-focused legislation is not bad for business. Rather, protecting
employees' concerted activity is beneficial to the overall employment
relationship. It gives employees a say in the terms and conditions of their
employment, and it results in a better and more productive work environment,
creating a symbiotic relationship that many forward thinking and progressive
CEOs have learned to harness and foster 29 7 : "Embracing social media isn't just
291

292
293
294

supra note 276, at 2, 11-12.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-157 (2013).
Hirsch, supra note 178, at 1108-11 (discussing informational disparities and asymmetry).
See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 556 (1978) (discussing the scope of rights
OLSON,

protected by the "mutual aid or protection" clause of Section 7).
295

See supra Part VI.A.

Steve Denning, Is the Goal of a Corporation to Make Money?, FORBES (Sept. 26,
2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/09/26/is-the-goal-of-a-corporation-to-makemoney/ (comparing the performance of companies that use traditional management compared
with the profits of companies using radical management-to no surprise, the companies open to
new ideas and radical management performed much better).
297
See, e.g., Brandfog Survey 2014: The Global, Social CEO, BRANDFOG (2014),
www.brandfog.com/CEOSocialMediaSurvey/BRANDfog_2014_CEO_Survey.pdf
(discussing
the business benefits of actively engaging in social media); see also William Arruda, Why Social
Savvy CEOs Thrive and Anti-Social Ones Won't Survive, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/williamarruda/2014/08/10/why-social-savvy-ccos-thrive-and-anti-social-ones296
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a bit of fun, it's a vital way to communicate, keep your ear to the ground and

improve your business."29 8
The argument that social media has the potential for bad actors is
certainly grounded in sound possibility and fact, but when dealing with people,
is this risk not ever-present? As discussed above, people often get fired for
Facebook posts. But, if the activity they are engaging in is not covered under
concerted activity or another Section 7 right, the employer is well within his
rights to fire the employee. 2 99 The doctrine of concerted activity cuts both ways,
and each case must be tried on its individual facts.3 00 Ultimately, employers
retain the upper hand through the doctrine of entrepreneurial control, 30 where
the employer bears the mere burden of showing the necessity of a business
decision when justifying an employment policy or an employment decision.
Thus, immediate employer-defensiveness is unwarranted because employers'
rights remain protected.30 2
VIII. CONCLUSION

The Board, courts, and employers alike appear to let fear and selfish
short-term goals-whether economic or political-eclipse the rights of the
people the Act is meant to empower: the middle class worker, the backbone of
our economy and our society.
Now, with the burgeoning communication platform that social media
provides, the courts have the opportunity "to restore to its intended vi or the
right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection," 0 and

wont-survive/. This undermines the prevailing argument that what is good for the employee is
bad for the employer. Perhaps the Board is the entity that can restore worker dignity and pride in
their employment. After all, "[p]aying your employees well is not only the right thing to do, but it
makes for good business." Taylor, supra note 282.
298
Arruda, supra note 297.
299
See Knauz BMW, 358 N.L.R.B No. 164, *18 (2012).
300
See Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984), remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d
941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), enforced sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he question of whether an employee engaged in
concerted activity is, at its heart, a factual one.").
301
See generally Haggai Hurvitz, American Labor Law and the Doctrine of Entrepreneurial
Property Rights: Boycotts, Courts, and the JudicialReorientationof 1886-1895, 8 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. LAW 307 (1986); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and QuasiEmployers: An Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the BorderlandBetween
an Employer-and-EmployeeRelationship, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 605 (2012).
302
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2013).
303
Staughton Lynd, Government Without Rights: The LaborLaw Vistion ofArchibald Cox, 4
INDUS. REL. L.J. 483, 495 (1981).
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provide the "day of reckoning for those who defraud the laborer of his hire."a
Any interpretation of the NLRA that chills employees' Section 7 rights ought to
be avoided because that notion alone violates the spirit of the act. Further, any
decision that inhibits individual employees' right to engage in concerted
activity flies in the face of legislative history305 :
There are not two abstract and distinguishable categories of
action-individual action for self-interest and collective action
for mutual interest-one which Congress chose not to protect
and the other which Congress chose to protect, but rather a
continuum of individual activity-of individuals choosing to
speak and act on their own behalf, singly and in small and
large groups. Thus, the narrow reading of the Act proceeds
upon a false dichotomy, for at the core of the freedom of the
individual to protest in a group necessarily lies the freedom of
the individual to protest at all.
Because many employees are handicapped by information
asymmetries, protected use of social media can help to level the playing field
for nonunion members who lack the expertise of union organizers. Generally,
the nonunion sector stands to benefit the most from the extension of the
doctrine of protected concerted activity to colloquial organizing efforts through
social media. Social media's ability to reach a large audience allows for the
collaboration of ideas and, in many cases, input from non-coworkers who may
bring a different perspective, potentially improving employees' understanding
of their rights under the law. Recognition that social media posts and
discussions on people's Facebook walls or Twitter feeds are more akin to oral
communications than written communications provides for an additional layer
of protection from employer prohibition.3 07

304

Robin D. G. Kelley, "A Day of Reckoning," Dreams of Reparations, in REDRESS FOR

HISTORICAL INJUSTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ON REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY, JIM CROW, AND

THEIR LEGACIES 204 (Michael T. Martin & Marilyn Yaquinto eds., 2007).
305

Robert A. Gorman & Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of

"Concert"under the NationalLabor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 286,331-46 (1981).
306

Id. at 344-45.

307
See supra Part III.A (discussing the distinction between oral and written communications
and solicitations). There is even a solid argument that email is more akin to oral communications
rather than written because of its nature. See also Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121
(2007) (Liebman & Walsh, B.M., dissenting in part) (stating that "the NLRB has become the
'Rip Van Winkle of administrative agencies.' Only a Board that has been asleep for the past 20
years could . .. contend, as the majority does, that an e-mail system is a piece of communications
equipment to be treated just as the law treats bulletin boards, telephones, and pieces of scrap
paper." (quoting NLRB v. Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1992))).
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Further, the subjective prong in Mushroom Transportation should not
be discounted as it was in Meyers3 when applied in the context of social
media. Social media is a forum where colloquial language prevails, and failing
to consider the intent of the person making a post in which he is looking toward
group action is a failure to appropriately consider the policy and purpose of the
NLRA. Perhaps most importantly, the Board and the courts must not overlook
the stated mission in Purple Communications: "We seek to make '[n]ational
labor policy . .. responsive 30to9 the enormous technological changes that are
taking place in our society."'
Let today be the "day of reckoning for those who defraud the laborer of
his hire" by recognizing the rights of employees to engage in concerted activity
in ways that comport with this technological world.31 Progress will be met
with opposition, but perhaps that opposition is akin to a toddler who refuses to
take an antibiotic. To make the transition less painful for stagnating employers,
the conversation needs to change. The tension between employer and employee
does not have to exist. As discussed above, there is abundant evidence that
investing in your employees is good for business, and the most successful
CEOs have recognized this. To look at the bigger picture, the erosion of
workers' rights is directly correlated to income inequality and the disappearing
middle class. A worker-focused interpretation of the doctrine of concerted
activity in the social media context is not only imperative to the future of the
NLRA's relevance, but it is also a step toward a better, more equal, and
empowered society.
Benjamin J. Hogan*

See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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Purple Commc'ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 2014 WL 6989135, at *17 (2014) (quoting
Register-Guard, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1121, enforced in part, remanded in part sub nom. Guard
Publ'g v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
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Kelley, supra note 304, at 204.
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